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EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
THE STANDING OF POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 
Benjamin Minhao Chen† & Zhiyu Li†
Abstract: The principal-agent model of administrative law sees bureaucrats as 
imperfectly supervised agents of their political principals and courts as a tool used by the 
latter to monitor and check the former.  This paper compares how the class of plaintiffs 
authorized to bring suit against governmental bodies has been defined in three countries 
where one should expect to find significant barriers to administrative litigation—Japan, 
Singapore, and the People’s Republic of China.  Although these three Asian countries 
have traditionally been one-party dominated states, we do observe substantial differences 
in how legislatures and courts have addressed the issue of standing over time.  It is 
possible to explain these variations by examining three factors.  First, the local 
governments are, in some countries, sub-entities or agents of the national government.  
Thus, administrative law might be used to regulate the acts of local governments in 
addition to agencies, leading to broader notions of standing.  Second, the level of political 
competition could influence the doctrine of standing by incentivizing political 
incumbents to secure alternative avenues for challenging the policies of their successors.  
Third, the legal process is not the only mechanism available for monitoring the behavior 
of agents.  For example, the Administrative Management Agency, xinfang system, and 
“Meet the People Sessions” offer channels for non-judicial resolution of administrative 
disputes in Japan, China, and Singapore respectively.  Yet courts and other monitoring 
mechanisms are not perfect substitutes; the different quality and quantity of the 
information collected, the creation of legal rules binding future decisions, and transaction 
costs of overriding judicial outcomes distinguish between them.  This last factor is, in 
general, not easily resolved in one direction or another.  The larger conclusion drawn is 
that Positive Political Theory, while insightful, may not always give an elegant structure 
to comparative studies in administrative law. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Does Positive Political Theory (PPT) explain doctrinal developments 
in administrative law?  This perspective on administrative law, also referred 
to as “rational choice”1 or “political economy,”2 challenges the conventional 
emphasis in legal scholarship on the values of procedural and administrative 
                                                   
† Ph.D. student in Jurisprudence and Social Policy; University of California Berkeley School of 
Law, benched@berkeley.edu. 
† J.S.D. candidate, University of California Berkeley School of Law; lizhiyu@berkeley.edu.  This 
paper benefitted from the comments of Robert Cooter, Lowell Dittmer, Robert A. Kagan, Hua Lin, Laurent 
Mayali, Martin Shapiro, Rachel Stern, and Shangdong Yang, as well as audiences at the 52nd Annual 
Meeting of the Public Choice Conference and the Younger Comparativists Committee of the American 
Society of Comparative Law 4th Annual Global Conference. 
1 See, e.g., Linda Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Rational 
Choice and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1996). 
2 See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa, & Jud Mathews, Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: 
Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2014) [hereinafter 
Garoupa & Mathews]. 
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fairness.3  It does so by characterizing legislative and judicial outcomes as 
the product of choices by individual or group actors seeking to maximize 
their interests in a strategic environment.  In recent years, however, the PPT 
account of administrative law in the United States has been called into 
question by its performance in comparative contexts.  After a review of the 
relevant law in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 
some scholars, such as M. Elizabeth Magill and Daniel Ortiz, have 
concluded that “something other than constitutional design best explains the 
existence and shape of judicial review of administrative action”—judicial 
culture. 4   In contrast, other scholars, such as Nuno Garoupa and Jud 
Mathews, have presented a model that takes into account the relative control 
that politicians have over government bureaucracy and courts.5  By factoring 
in judicial autonomy, their model “explain[s] differences within legal 
families in a way that previous political economy models could not.”6  In 
particular, they argue that differences between American, British, French, 
and German administrative law conform to PPT predictions. 
But administrative law is not applied exclusively to agencies.  It may 
sometimes be used to contest the decisions of local governments.  In 
addition, courts are not the only means for legislatures to ensure that their 
instructions are being faithfully executed.  For example, legislatures have 
instituted ombudsman offices as another tool used to monitor compliance 
and rein in agency discretion.7   These institutional details influence the 
development of administrative law and should be included in a PPT 
framework.  To illustrate this, this paper will explore the elements required 
for plaintiffs to have standing to initiate judicial review of administrative 
action in three jurisdictions: Japan, Singapore, and the People’s Republic of 
China (China). 
                                                   
3 See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill & Daniel R. Ortiz, Comparative Positive Political Theory, in 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 134, 134 (Susan Rose-Akerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2011)
(stating that “[l]ittle in the last thirty years has so changed thinking about American administrative law as 
Positive Political Theory (PPT)”) [hereinafter Magill & Ortiz]. 
4 Id. at 145.  
5 See generally Garoupa & Mathews, supra note 2. 
6 Id. at 31. 
7 The ombudsman is a governmental office that investigates public complaints of administrative 
abuse or inefficiency.  It does not exercise a judicial function and instead resolves disputes through 
recommendations and/or mediation.  In the United Kingdom, for example, both the findings and the 
recommendations of Ombudsmen are non-binding on the government.  See generally Bradley v. Work and 
Pensions Secretary [2008] EWCA (Civ) 36 (Eng.). But the Ombudsman may bring to the attention of 
Parliament instances of maladministration or injustice in the form of special reports.  See Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act 1967 (Eng.). 
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There are several considerations informing the selection of our case 
studies.  First, while Magill and Ortiz limit their attention to judicial review 
for administrative reasonableness, this article focuses on standing.  This is 
because narrow standing restricts the use of courts as an avenue for 
politically marginalized interests that seek to challenge official policy.  The 
legal obstacle posed by standing also chills the interpretative development of 
the law by judicial actors.  If the judge who decides a case thereby 
participates in the “authoritative reconstruction of the law-maker’s law,”8
preventing administrative disputes from being heard reduces the extent to 
which the judiciary shares in the legislature’s power.9
Second, these three countries are, or were for a major part of their 
recent history, stable, party-dominated states.10  It is therefore unlikely that 
electoral competition explains disparities between Chinese and Singaporean 
administrative law.  On the other hand, the relatively recent emergence of 
political turnover in Japan provides a source of variation that is both relevant 
and interesting for PPT analysis. 
Third, citizens in these three countries share similar cultural attitudes 
towards litigation.  There is a substantial body of scholarship that suggests 
that the Japanese cherish harmony and prefer informal mechanisms of 
dispute resolution over formal, adversarial procedures. 11   Under the 
influence of Confucianism, the Chinese have traditionally preferred to settle 
disputes in private rather than in a courtroom. 12   In Singapore, the 
                                                   
8 MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 69 (2002). 
This would seem to be true only of common law countries, but judicial lawmaking has been taking place in 
civil law countries as well. See, e.g., Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France For the Act of Things: 
A Study of Judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. REV. 1299 (1988). 
9 This is not to say that courts may not find a way around the obstacle.  See Manoj Mate, Public 
Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS:
JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 262, 272 (Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein, & Robert A. 
Kagan eds., 2013) (“The Court’s decision in the Judges’ Case was thus a classic Marbury move: the Court 
expanded its own jurisdiction by endorsing standing for [public interest litigation], but gave the government 
what it wanted by deferring to the supremacy of the Executive in transfers and appointments.”) (emphasis 
added). 
10 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has governed Japan from 1955 to the present, except for brief 
interruptions between 1993 and 1994 and between 2009 and 2012.  The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
has ruled China since 1949. In Singapore, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has been in power since 
independence from Malaysia in 1965.  
11 See, e.g., Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN:
THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41, 44 (Arthur von Mehren ed., 1963).  Kawashima asserts 
that the social rules of respectful obedience or kyǀjun and authority or ken-i undergird most relationships in 
Japan. Hence, resorting to law is incompatible with the implied hierarchy of Japanese society. 
12 See Lester Ross, Changing Profile of Dispute Resolution in Rural China: The Case of Zouping 
County, Shandong, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 15, 16 (1989). 
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government has articulated an ideology that legal scholar Eugene Tan has 
summarized as “civility over contentiousness,” and “responsibilities over 
rights.”13  Thus, our comparative analysis controls for legal consciousness as 
a significant explanatory factor. 
In dominant-party states where control of the legislative chamber 
coincides with the exercise of executive power, one should find that the 
judiciary has a marginal role to play in policing the conduct of 
administrative agencies.  Thus, one should also expect the class of persons 
permitted to sue for relief in administrative cases to be carefully 
circumscribed.  Yet, the law of standing has diverged in these three 
jurisdictions.  By attempting to explain these and other differences, this 
paper hopes to demonstrate both the extent and the limits of PPT as a model 
for understanding administrative law.  
Section II offers a quick primer on the principal-agent model that is at 
the core of PPT.  The goal is not to conduct an exhaustive survey but to 
introduce the type of reasoning that has been applied in recent work on 
comparative administrative law.  Section III summarizes some of the 
jurisdictional elements for judicial review of administrative action in each of 
the three countries through a review of statutory and case law.  Section IV 
compares the variation and evolution in standing doctrines and analyzes 
them through the PPT framework.  Section V discusses the range of 
institutional designs that the legislature could use to monitor and discipline 
those to whom it has delegated policymaking functions.  
II. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
The classic principal-agent paradigm posits bureaucrats as servants of 
the legislature tasked with implementing the legislative intent as expressed 
through statutes.14  Its “central premise” is that “bureaucratic institutions and 
legislative-bureaucratic interaction . . . [should be interpreted] as promoting 
the interests of the principal to the greatest extent possible.” 15   The 
                                                   
13 Eugene Tan KB, Harmony as Ideology, Culture, and Control: Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Singapore, 9 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 120 (2007).  The 1991 White Paper distinguished between “Asian 
societies” that “emphasize the interests of the community” and “Western societies” that “stress the rights of 
the individual.”  For Singapore, “an emphasis on the interests of the community” is a “key survival value” 
to be “preserve[d]” and “strengthen[ed].”  
14 See, e.g., Sean Gailmard, Accountability and Principal-Agent Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 90, 95 (Mark Bovens, et al., eds., 2014) (“One of the earliest, and still most 
robust, principal-agent literatures in political science takes bureaucrats as agents of some constellations of 
political principals – most often Congress, the president or executive actors, and/or courts.”). 
15 Id. at 96. 
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legislature might prescribe a mission for an agency without specifying in 
detail how it is to be accomplished or the rules that have to be followed in 
reaching a determination.  In such situations, the legislature delegates broad 
authority to the agency.  Alternatively, the legislature might seek to 
constrain agency discretion either by narrowly defining the scope of its 
mandate or by setting up procedural requirements such as notice-and-
comment or cost-benefit analysis.  The choice is influenced by, among other 
things, the level of trust in the bureaucratic agent, in particular whether the 
agent will faithfully apply his or her expertise to respond to unique 
circumstances rather than pursue his or her own political agenda and 
preferences.16  It is also shaped by the possibility of monitoring the agent 
and correcting his or her excesses. 
Not always having the resources to monitor the activities of the 
bureaucracy, legislatures often empower judicial actors to supervise agency 
activity in a number of ways.  For example, legislatures sometimes grant 
courts the authority to review administrative decisions.  In addition, 
legislatures can create a private right of action, allowing private citizens and 
interest groups to check agencies that might otherwise be tempted to stray 
from legislative preferences.17  In doing so, the legislature uses judges not as 
policemen who actively “patrol” for infractions, but as “fire alarms” that 
attract the attention of lawmakers to ongoing violations. 18   In addition, 
legislators themselves may look to courts as an instrument for preserving 
their political gains after they leave office.19  In the context of the United 
States, for example, Mathew McCubbins, et al., argue that “the primary 
explanation for the failure of administrative reform proposals before World 
War II but their success later was the desire of New Democrats to ‘hard wire’ 
the policies of the New Deal against an expected Republican, anti-New Deal 
political tide in the late 1940s.”20  If true, the Congressional supporters of the 
                                                   
16 See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, The Organization of Administrative Justice Systems: The Role of 
Political Mistrust, in ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 161, 162 (Michael Adler ed., 2010).  The 
delegation of policy-making authority to agents may also be necessary to incentivize them to acquire task-
specific expertise.  See SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN W. PATTY, LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING 25 (Benjamin I. 
Page et al. eds., 2013). 
17 Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 243 (1998).  
18 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–166 (1984) [hereinafter McCubbins & Schwartz]. 
19 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest 
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 878 (1975); Robert Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative 
Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 297 (1996). 
20 Mathew D. McCubbins et al., The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 180, 180 (1999).  
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New Deal did not promulgate administrative procedure to realize the ideal of 
due process that had hitherto been pursued in an uneven fashion by courts.  
Rather, they acted to create a forum for scrutinizing agency conduct if and 
when they came under the command of a politically unfriendly President. 
Recent scholarship has emphasized the relevance of political structure 
for understanding comparative administrative law.  Consider the following 
spatial model of agency regulation under a parliamentary system.21
Figure 1 
The line above represents a one-dimensional policy space.  Pparliament is the 
legislature’s ideal.  The agency starts by making a policy that is observed by 
all actors.  The legislature may then choose to override the agency, but this 
involves transaction costs.  If the agency selects either Plower or Pupper, the 
legislature is indifferent between overruling and sustaining the agency’s 
action.  Under this set-up, the agency has discretion to select any policy 
between Plower and Pupper.  This is because the legislature finds the benefits of 
revising any policy in that interval to be smaller than the costs.  Hence, in 
equilibrium, the agency selects Plower and the legislature allows Plower to stand.  
In contrast, under a presidential system, both the legislature and the 
executive have to agree to reverse an agency’s policy.  
                                                   
21 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 154 (2000). 
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Figure 2 
The agency has greater discretion since it is able to select a policy from a 
larger interval, [Pl, lower, Pe, upper].22  Magill and Ortiz, therefore, argue that if 
PPT holds, judicial review should “be much more limited in domain and less 
searching in application in a parliamentary than in a presidential system.”23  
They find, however, that this is not borne out by a comparison of 
reasonableness review in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany.  The alternative, they suggest, is the “traditional explanation that 
administrative law scholars give for the existence and shape of judicial 
review of administrative action: judicial cultures.”24
Because judges reviewing agency behavior are themselves agents, 
political principals must balance the authority delegated to agencies against 
the discretion exercised by courts.25  Garoupa and Mathews develop this idea 
by elaborating a typology consisting, on the one hand, of low or high 
autonomy agencies and, on the other hand, of low or high autonomy 
courts.26  According to this model, agencies are considered “low autonomy” 
if they operate in a parliamentary system or under a unitary form of 
government and “high autonomy” if they operate in a presidential system or 
                                                   
22 To see that this is true, notice that if the agency promulgates a policy between Pl, lower and Pe, lower, 
only the executive, not the legislature, has an incentive to initiate change. 
23 Magill & Ortiz, supra note 3, at 138. 
24 Id. at 145. 
25 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1567 (2010) (“Faithful agent theories adopt a principal-agent model of [statutory] 
interpretation.  The interpreter is cast in the role of subordinate agent, seeking in good faith to carry out the 
instructions of the lawmaker, who is understood to be the principal.” (citation omitted)). 
26 Garoupa & Mathews, supra note 2, at 13. 
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under a federal form of government, while courts are considered “low 
autonomy” if they are specialized or if there is a career judiciary and “high 
autonomy” if they are generalist or if there is a recognition judiciary.  The 
conclusions of a game-theoretic analysis of the interaction between these 
types are reproduced and summarized in the following figure.27
Table 1 
Agencies
Low autonomy High autonomy
Courts 
Low autonomy 
¾ Broad delegation
¾ Narrow scope for judicial 
review 
¾ Application of expertise by 
agencies 
¾ Judicial review plays 
marginal role 
¾ Broad delegation
¾ Broad scope for judicial 
review 
¾ Application of expertise by 
agencies 
¾ Judicial review plays 
important role 
High autonomy 
¾ Broad delegation 
¾ Narrow scope for judicial 
review 
¾ Application of expertise by 
agencies 
¾ Courts push to expand role 
of judicial review. 
¾ Mixed strategies
¾ Broad and narrow 
delegations 
¾ Agencies sometimes apply 
expertise and sometimes 
play safe 
¾ Courts sometimes review 
aggressively and sometimes 
defer to agency. 
 While the party-dominated states that we have selected do not hew 
exactly to any of these ideal types, they could, on first pass, be placed in the 
quadrant of low autonomy agencies and low autonomy courts.  Hence, one 
should anticipate a narrow scope of judicial review and, in particular, limited 
standing.28  We now turn to the law in these countries. 
III. STANDING TO SUE IN JAPAN, SINGAPORE, AND CHINA
A.  Japan 
The Administrative Case Litigation Law (ACLL) of 1962 provides for 
four types of named suits.  The first is “direct attack suits,” or kǀkoku soshǀ, 
which encompasses “lawsuits of grievance relating to the exercise of public 
power by an administrative agency.”29  The second is defined as “party suits,” 
                                                   
27 Id. at 14, 17, 21, 24, 28. 
28 Id. at 17. 
29 John O. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law, in JAPANESE LAW: READINGS IN THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF JAPANESE LAW 301, 307 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2001) (citation omitted). 
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or tǀjisha soshǀ, in which administrative actions are challenged collaterally 
in a civil suit.30  The third is labeled “public suits,” or minshǌ soshǀ.31  These 
are corrective actions that may be “instituted by persons qualified to vote 
without having the qualifications of having any other legal interest.” 32  
However, such suits must be explicitly provided for by statute.33  The fourth 
type of suit is “agency suits,” or kikan soshǀ, used to resolve jurisdictional 
disputes between governmental bodies.34  
The decision of a public authority is typically challenged through the 
kǀkoku soshǀ, which has a number of procedural standing requirements.  
Critically, the plaintiff must suffer an injury to his legal interest; an injury-
in-fact is not sufficient for standing.35  A legal interest is usually “created by 
provisions vesting an administrative agency with the duty of protecting some 
personal interest.”36  The Bathhouse Case is frequently cited as a judicial 
explanation of this definition.37  The suit was brought by a bathhouse to 
contest the issuance of a license to a competitor.  Bathhouses were licensed 
subject to the condition that they be located at least 250 meters apart from 
each other. 38   This restriction was officially justified on public health 
                                                   
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 One example is a residents’ suit, which targets financial irregularity or irresponsibility in local 
governments. Any registered resident of a prefecture, city, town, or village may sue for illegally expended 
money to be returned by the defendant to the relevant public entity.  Between 1983 and 1987, there were 42 
such suits filed against prefectural governments and up to 250 against municipalities. See Takehisa 
Nakagawa, Participatory Administrative Law (unpublished manuscript), http://www.sota.j.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/info/Papers/nakagawa.pdf. 
34 See Gyǀsei jiken sosho ho [Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No. 139 of 1962, translated 
in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 2391 (1989), at 21, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fbe13c1a.html 
[hereinafter ACLL]; see also Haley, supra note 29, at 307–308.  
35 “Suits for revocation of a disposition and decision (hereinafter referred to as “revocation 
litigation”) may be filed only by persons having legal interests for seeking the revocation of the said 
disposition or decision (including persons having legal interests to be recovered by the revocation of a 
disposition or decision even after the effect of the disposition or decision no longer exists due to the 
expiration of the period or any other reason).”  ACLL, supra note 34, at Art. 9.  “In a revocation litigation, 
no person shall seek a revocation on the grounds of illegality not concerned with his legal interest.”  Id. at 
Art. 10. 
36 Ichiro Ogawa, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions in Japan, 43 WASH. L. REV. 1075, 1087 
(1968). See also Masashi Kaneko, Les Juges et les Grands Choix Politiques et Administratifs de l’Etat en 
Droit Administratif Japonais, in ETUDES DE DROIT JAPONAIS 380 (Société de Législation Comparée, 1989) 
and MARK J. RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 199–201 
(1999).  
37 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 26, 1955, 9 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHǋ [KEISHǋ] 89 
(Japan), translated in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 293 (1964).  See also Ichiro 
Ogawa, supra note 36, at 1087–88 n.45; HIDEO TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 689–92 (1978); 
CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 509 (2012).
38 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 26, 1955, 9 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHǋ [KEISHǋ] 89, 
translated in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 294–95 (1964). 
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grounds.39  The court found, however, that the constraint was also “intended 
to prevent undue competition among public bathhouse proprietors” and that 
a “plaintiff’s business interest should be considered protected by lawful 
operation of the licensing system.”40  Therefore, “he may well have standing 
to ask for the annulment of a third party’s license, because his interest is not 
a mere reflex, but rather a legal interest . . . .”41  
A dispute concerning the construction of a shopping center in Etsurigo 
Village also serves to illustrate the concept of “legal interest.”  The Diet 
passed the Large Scale Retail Stores Law in 1973, superseding the 
Department Store Law of 1937.42  Under the previous regulatory regime, 
department stores could not engage in any business unless they obtained 
prior administrative clearance.43  The 1973 law eliminated the registration 
requirement, but required entrants to keep the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry appraised of any proposed activity.44  Furthermore, the 
Ministry could require the entrant to negotiate with existing merchants in the 
area over the terms under which the latter would agree to the opening of a 
new store. 45   In January 1981, 117 local merchants petitioned for 
nullification of the Ministry’s recommendation of a plan submitted by the 
Etsurigo Shopping Centre Cooperative Co. and revised by the Tohoku Large 
Stores Council.  The plaintiffs alleged conflicts of interest and procedural 
irregularities,46 but their contentions were summarily rebuffed. 47  The court 
ruled inter alia that the mention of “enterprise opportunities” in Article 1 of 
the Large Scale Retail Stores Law did not give rise to anything more than a 
“reflex” interest on the part of existing businesses.48   
                                                   
39 Ichiro Ogawa, supra note 36, at 1088 n.45. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.; see also RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 36, at 200–01. 
42 Frank K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in Comparative and 
International Perspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396, 404–05 (1996). 
43 Id. at 405. 
44 Id.
45 Id.  See also Jean Heilman Grier, Japan's Regulation of Large Retail Stores: Political Demands 
Versus Economic Interests, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1 (2001). 
46 Upham, supra note 42, at 411 (“Specifically, the local merchants alleged that President Takahashi 
of the Etsurigo Chamber of Commerce, whose son was the president of the Etsurigo Shopping Center 
Cooperative, had a direct conflict of interest and had selected members of the Adjustment Board solely on 
the basis of their pro-shopping center views.”). 
47 Id. at 415 (“Had consumers been suing MITI on the ground that the 6.390 square meters allotted to 
Jusco in the recommendation was too small to serve their interests, the result would have been the same. . . . 
[T]he only potential plaintiff . . . would be a prospective large retailer dissatisfied with the amount of space 
given him through the adjustment process.”). 
48 Id. 
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In a more recent example, the Japanese Supreme Court held that 
residents whose persons and property would be threatened in the event of a 
natural disaster had standing to challenge the approval of the construction of 
six golf courses upstream of the River Ozato.49  The justices were persuaded 
that the provisions of Article 10-2 of the Forestry Law “should be construed 
to aim not only at the ensurance [sic] of the public interest function of the 
forest . . . [but also] the protection of the safety of the life and health of the 
inhabitants living within a certain range of areas adjacent to the area to be 
developed as a specific interest of the individuals.”50
Intimately tied to the question of standing is the doctrine of shobunsei, 
sometimes translated as “ripeness”51 or “in the nature of a disposition.”52  
Article 3 of the Administrative Case Litigation Law defines kǀkoku soshǀ as 
“a litigation of dissatisfaction relating to the exercise of public power by an 
administrative agency.”53  For a kǀkoku soshǀ to go forward there must first 
be a shobun.54  As articulated by the Supreme Court of Japan in 1955, a 
shobun is an “official action which forms the rights and duties of the citizens 
or confirms the scope thereof.”55  In that case, a notice from the Atami City 
Agricultural Council to a farmer regarding the boundaries of the latter’s land 
was found not to be a shobun because it had no legal effect and was not 
adverse to the farmer’s property rights. 56   The lesson drawn is that 
“supervisory orders, permissions, approvals, and regulations among agencies 
or within a single agency cannot be the object of litigation.”57
Prior to the enactment of the ACLL in 1962, it was generally 
understood that plaintiffs could not file a “preventive” suit.58  While many 
hoped that the ACLL would lead to a broader notion of shobun, subsequent 
developments indicated that the traditional understanding had not been 
displaced.  The outcome of Edogawa Ward v. Minister of Transportation is 
especially instructive in this regard. 59   In 1972, the Minister of 
                                                   
49 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 13, 2001, 55 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 283, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.03.13-1996.-Gyo-Tsu-.No.180.html. 
50 Id. 
51 See e.g. RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 36, at 196. 
52 Robert W. Dziubla, The Impotent Sword of Japanese Justice: The Doctrine of Shobunsei as a 
Barrier to Administrative Litigation, 18 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 37, 38 (1985). 
53 ACLL, supra note 34, at Art. 3.  
54 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 24, 1995, 9 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 217. 
55  Id. 
56 Id.; see also Dziubla, supra note 52, at 45. 
57 Dziubla, supra note 52, at 53. 
58 Ichiro Ogawa, supra note 36, at 1083.  
59 Tokyo Kǀtǀ Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Oct. 24, 1973, 722 HANREI JIHƿ 52. 
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Transportation published plans for a railway line linking Tokyo to Narita 
and signed off on its construction by the contractor, Japan Railway 
Construction Corporation. Residents within a designated area of 200 meters 
from the proposed tracks sought judicial relief.  The Tokyo High Court 
dismissed the claim: 
At the stage of the approval of a Construction Implementation 
Plan, it has not necessarily been concretely confirmed who will 
in the future become an interested party when the Plan is 
executed.  In that sense, a Construction Implementation Plan 
and its official approval must be considered as abstract in nature.  
In other words, that approval is unlike a concrete disposition 
directed at a specified individual.  Furthermore, there is no 
provision that requires its publication, and it itself has no effect 
whatsoever on citizens’ rights and duties.60
The implication is that any potential claim must be deferred pending actual 
implementation of the policy. 61  However, this means that sunk costs and 
irreversibility of damage could eventually militate against judicial 
invalidation of the administrative act.62  
Restrictive construction of shobun also facilitates the use of 
administrative guidance, a form of regulation whereby an authority invites 
the relevant parties to voluntarily adhere to its guidelines.63  As the advice 
has no legal effect until it is actually enforced, it has historically not been 
considered a reviewable action.  For example, in Okamura v. Japan, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that 345 political activists not apply 
                                                   
60 Frank K. Upham, After Minamata: Current Prospects and Problems in Japanese Environmental 
Litigation, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213, 237 (1979). 
61 See, e.g., id. at 238; Dziubla, supra note 52, at 47; GOODMAN, supra note 37, at 514. 
62 See, e.g., Sapporo Chiho Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Mar 27, 1997, 1598 HANREI JIHƿ 33, 39 
(Japan), translated in 38 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 397, 428-29 (1999).  (“Nibutani dam has already been 
completed with an enormous expenditure of tens of billions of yen and is filling with water… we are [thus] 
forced to recognize the extraordinary harm to the public interest that would arise from reversing the 
Confiscatory Administrative Rulings. Additionally, we find that the Poromoy Chashi has already been 
destroyed and the Pe-ure-pukka and Kankanrerekehe Chinomishir have each been demolished by the dam 
construction.  Even if the Confiscatory Administrative Rulings are reversed, these sites cannot be 
restored.”).  The expropriation of Ainu lands was declared illegal but the dam was permitted to continue 
operation. 
63 See generally Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally 
Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1984); Takehisa Nakagawa, 
Administrative Informality in Japan: Governmental Activities Outside Statutory Authorization, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 175 (2000). 
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for passports to attend a festival in Moscow. 64   This request was not 
considered to be a reviewable disposition.65   Since there was no formal 
application, there could not have been any refusal, and hence shobun, by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  While it is natural that consent should act as a 
bar to remedy, informality can take on coercive overtones when the time 
horizon of interactions is long and the powers of the governmental agency 
are broad.66  
Despite traditionally narrow rules of standing and shobun, judicial 
interpretations and legislative reforms have gradually opened the door to a 
more generous application of these principles.  In 2001, the Justice System 
Reform Council expressed a vision: to “transform the excessive advance-
control/adjustment type society to an after-the-fact review/remedy type 
society.”67  Amendments to the ACLL in 2004 codified evolving case law,68
and provide for standing if the plaintiff has a right protected by a statute or 
ordinance that is relevant to the administrative action being reviewed.69  This 
shift is exemplified by Izuka v. Director of Kanto Regional Development 
Bureau (“Odakyǌ Railroad Case”).70  There, the Supreme Court of Japan 
partially reversed the judgment of the lower court, ruling that residents 
                                                   
64 Tokyo Kǀtǀ Saibansho [Tokyo App. Ct.] 1962, 8 SHƿMU GEPPƿ 1836 (Japan). See also Young, 
supra note 63, at 954. 
65 Tokyo Kǀtǀ Saibansho [Tokyo App. Ct.] 1962, 8 SHƿMU GEPPƿ 1836 (Japan). See also Young, 
supra note 63, at 954. 
66 See Takehisa Nakagawa, supra note 63 (explaining that the concept of informality in the United 
States refers to the absence of either concrete rules or adversarial procedures whereas informality in the 
Japanese context implicates either extra-statutory policy-making or the employment of extra-statutory 
methods). 
67 Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council, JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL (June 
12, 2001), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html. 
68 Saikǀ Saibancho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 17, 1989, 43 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 56, 
translated in 10 WASEDA BULL.  COMP. L. 36, http://www.waseda.jp/hiken/jp/public/bulletin/pdf/10/ronbu
n/A02859211-00-000100036.pdf; Nagoya Kǀtǀ Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Jan. 27, 2003, 1818 HANREI 
JIHO 3, translated in 23 WASEDA BULL. COMP. L. 67 (2003) 
http://www.waseda.jp/hiken/jp/public/bulletin/pdf/23/ronbun/A02859211-00-000230067.pdf); see also
HITOSHI USHIJIMA, Administrative Law and Judicialized Governance in Japan, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 93 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 
2009); GOODMAN, supra note 37, at 511; Narufumi Kadomatsu, Judicial Governance Through Resolution 
of Legal Disputes - A Japanese Perspective, 4 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 41, 156 (2009). 
69 Gyǀsei jiken Soshǀhǀ No Ichibu Wo Kaiseisuru Hǀritsu [Act for Partial Revision of the 
Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No. 84 of 2004 (Japan) (“[T]he court shall also make reference 
to the purport and purpose of any relevant laws and regulations that share the purpose with the governing 
laws and regulations, and when considering the contents and nature of the interest, the court shall take into 
account the contents and nature of the interest that is likely to be injured if the disposition is made in 
violation of the governing laws and regulations as well as how and to what extent that it is likely to be 
injured.”). 
70 See Yuichiro Tsuji, The Legal Issues on Environmental Administrative Lawsuits Under the 
Amendment of ACLA in Japan, 1 YONSEI L.J. 339, 354 (2010). 
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whose property would not be directly affected by an approved over-ground 
rail line were nevertheless eligible to sue because they had a protected legal 
interest.71  Their legal interest issued from city ordinances that were enacted 
to safeguard the welfare of neighboring residents, in particular from damage 
to their health and living environment from noise and vibration.72   The 
doctrine of legal interest was further elaborated in a 2008 decision, 
Nakamura v. Hamamatsu City.73  In that case, the court reasoned that the 
promulgation of a plan for land readjustment immediately foreclosed the 
options of individual landowners. 74   It became “necessary to obtain 
permission from the prefectural governor in order to carry out, within the 
implementation zone, activities such as changing the shape or nature of the 
land or constructing, remodeling or extending buildings or other structures, 
which are likely to hinder the implementation of the land readjustment 
project . . . .”75  The effect was therefore not “general or abstract.”76
The definition of a shobun has also been interpreted more broadly by 
Japanese courts.  In Nakamura, the Grand Bench recognized that any 
revocation of the disposition of land substitution at a later stage “would 
cause serious confusion to the project as a whole” and be injurious to the 
public interest.77  It therefore announced that “it is reasonable to allow the 
filing of a suit to seek revocation of a decision to adopt a project plan at the 
stage when the decision is made.”78  Further, in a 2004 case, the Supreme 
Court held that a written notice of violation served on an importer by the 
director of the quarantine station was a shobun.79   The judgment of the 
Tokyo High Court, finding the notification to be “practical guidance” to the 
appellant and not legally binding on the Director-General of Customs, was 
                                                   
71 Id.
72 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 7, 2005, 2004 (Gyo-Hi) no. 114, 59 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 2645, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.12.07-2004.-Gyo-Hi-
.No..114.html. See also GOODMAN, supra note 37, at 511–12; Narufumi Kadomatsu, supra note 68, at 158 
(describing it as the “leading case on the interpretation of the newly inserted Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the 
ACLA”). 
73 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 10, 2008, 2005 (Gyo-Hi) no. 397, 62 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 2029, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2008.09.10-2005.-Gyo-Hi-
.No..397.html. 
74  Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.
78 Id. 
79 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 26, 2004, 2003 (Gyo-Hi) no. 206, 58 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 989, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.04.26-2003-Gyo-Hi-
No..206.html.  
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quashed.80  The next year, the Supreme Court of Japan heard Takano v. 
Governor of Toyama, an appeal from the Nagoya High Court. 81   The 
plaintiff in Takano had declined a “recommendation” made under the 
Medical Service Law. 82   The 1987 Notification from the Director of 
Insurance Bureau had cautioned that: 
If despite the recommendation made by the prefectural 
governor under Article 30–7 of the Medical Service Law 
because of particular necessity for facilitating the achievement 
of the medical scheme, the hospital has been established and an 
application has been filed for designation of the hospital as an 
insurance medical institution, the hospital shall be regarded as 
“extremely inappropriate” as provided in Article 43–3(2) of the 
Health Insurance Law, and the prefectural governor shall 
consult with the regional social insurance council for refusal to 
grant designation.83
In light of the “considerable certainty” of the “consequences,” the 
document sent to the applicant qualified as a disposition within the meaning 
of Article 3(2) of the ACLL.84
Table 2:  Summary of Japan 
Japan Pre-2004 Japan Post-2004
Interest Legal interest has to be expressly created 
by governing statute that charges the 
agency to protect some personal interest; 
others as provided by statute (under
minshǌ soshǀ) 
In determining legal interest, to also 
consider “purport and purpose” of 
relevant laws and regulations 
Action Existence of shobun, i.e. an official 
action pertaining to rights and duties of 
citizens; internal and inter-agency orders 
and regulations not subject to suit; no
“preventive” suits; excludes 
administrative guidance 
Nakamura (reviewability of “preventive” 
suits); Takano (reviewability of 
administrative guidance if consequences 
are “considerabl[y]” certain) 
Entity Administrative agencies; local 
governments (under minshǌ soshǀ) 
Administrative agencies; local 
governments (under minshǌ soshǀ) 
Between 1990 and 2007, there has been a gradual rise in the number of 
                                                   
80 Id. 
81 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 15, 2004, 59 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 1661, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=760. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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administrative cases litigated before the courts.85  Yet, it was estimated in 
1997 that approximately twenty-five percent of all such suits were still being 
dismissed for lack of standing, or shobun. 86   Although there has been 
movement in the direction of liberalization in the years leading up to 2004, 
its impact on governance and regulation in Japan still awaits detailed study. 
B. Singapore 
A colony of the British Empire from 1819 to 1963, the Singapore 
legal system has traditionally been influenced by legal developments in 
England.  Of the 1,383 cases cited as authorities in the 527 decisions of the 
High Court of Singapore reported between 1965 and 1985, 23.8% of them 
were local, whereas 66.7% were English.87  It is therefore no surprise that 
the framework for judicial review of administrative acts in Singapore is 
similar to that of the United Kingdom.  Indeed, in a lecture on the subject 
delivered in 2010 to students at the Singapore Management University, 
Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong commented that the “courts [of Singapore 
and the U.K.] apply the same principles because we inherited the same 
system of law.”88  The law of standing inherited from English law derives 
from the rules of court that restrict standing to parties having a sufficient 
interest and is reinforced by the common law distinction between private and 
public law.89
The first hurdle to be cleared before a suit may proceed is that the 
matter being contested has to be susceptible to review by the courts. 90  
Amongst other things, the issue has to be one of public law.  In Council of 
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, Lord Diplock 
emphasized the importance of the source of the decision-making authority, 
which “is nearly always nowadays a statute or subordinate legislation made 
                                                   
85 Narufumi Kadomatsu, supra note 68, at 147. 
86 HIROYUKI HATA & GO NAKAGAWA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF JAPAN 164 (1997). 
87 Walter Woon, The Applicability of English Law in Singapore, in THE SINGAPORE LEGAL SYSTEM
230 (Kevin Y.L. Tan ed., 2d ed. 1999).  
88 Chan Sek Keong, Judicial Review-From Angst to Empathy: A Lecture to Singapore Management 
University Second Year Law Students, 22 SING. ACAD. L.J. 469, 473 (2010). 
89 See H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 562–63, 572–74, 582–83, 589–90 
(10th ed. 2009). 
90 Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General [2012] SGCH 210 (“Leave to apply for 
prerogative orders will not be granted unless the court is satisfied as to the following: (a) The subject matter 
of the complaint is susceptible to judicial review; (b) The material before the court discloses an arguable 
case or a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought by the 
applicant; and (c) The applicant has sufficient interest in the matter.”). 
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under the statute.”91  A later judgment, rendered in R. v. Panel on Take-overs 
and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc, found the Panel on Take-overs and 
Mergers, an unincorporated, informal, and self-regulating body, to be 
nevertheless subject to judicial review.92 The critical factor there was the 
nature of the power being exercised.  By “devising, promulgating, amending 
and interpreting the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers,” the Panel could 
indirectly alter the legal status of persons.93  In the words of Lord Justice 
Lloyd, “[i]t has a giant’s strength.”94  Thus, the Datafin test considers both 
the source and the nature of the power being exercised.  This precedent was 
absorbed into Singapore law through Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee 
Lin Linda95 and reaffirmed in UDL Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Jurong 
Town Corp.96  The former concerned the dismissal of an employee, while 
the latter involved a lease renewal.  In both cases, the court noted that the 
action of the statutory agency, though ultimately having some basis in 
statute, came under contract law.  On the other hand, the public reprimand of 
the director of a corporation listed on the Singapore Exchange, an 
investment holding company, contained a public element and could 
therefore be reviewed.97   The court noted, among other things, that the 
Singapore Exchange “is an approved exchange under [Section] 16 of the 
[Securities and Futures Act]”98 and that “reprimand of directors of a listed 
company by . . . a front-line securities regulator, carries financial and 
business implications.”99  These facts made the reprimand power a public 
function “susceptible to judicial review for minimum compliance with the 
standards of ‘legality, rationality and procedural propriety.’”100
                                                   
91 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] 1 AC 374 (HL) 409 
(Lord Diplock) (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK)  
92 R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Ex Parte Datafin Plc, [1987] QB 815. (Eng.) [hereinafter 
R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers); see also Thio Li-Ann, Law and the Administrative State, in THE 
SINGAPORE LEGAL SYSTEM 160, 178 (Kevin Y.L. Tan ed., 2d ed. 1999).  
93 See R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, supra note 92 at 826. 
94 Id. (Lord Lloyd) at 845. 
95 Linda Lai Swee v. Public Service Commission [2000] SGHC 162 (although the court eventually 
concluded that the dismissal of a Land Office employee was undertaken pursuant to contract, it recognized 
the validity of the source test applied in Datafin). 
96 UDL Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Jurong Town Corp. [2011] SGHC 45. 
97 See Yeap Wai Kong v. Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd, [2012] SGHC 103 [hereinafter 
Yeap Wai Kong v. Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd]; see also Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh v. 
Attorney-General, [2013] SGCA 22. The curious reader may wonder about the status of administrative 
guidelines under Singapore law. See, e.g., Lines International Holding Pte Ltd v. Singapore Tourist 
Promotion Board and Port of Singapore Authority, [1997] 2 SLR 584 (rejecting the argument that 
guidelines have to be officially promulgated to be enforceable); Thio Li-Ann, supra note 92, at 172–173. 
98 Yeap Wai Kong v. Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd, supra note 97, at [21]. 
99 Id. at [25]. 
100 Id. at [28]. 
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The second obstacle is that the plaintiff must have a sufficient interest 
in the case.  Section 31(3) of the United Kingdom’s Senior Courts Act of 
1981 provides that leave for judicial review shall not be granted unless “the 
applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application 
relates.”101  This rule was duly applied in the seminal case of R. v. Inland 
Revenue Commissioners ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and 
Small Business Ltd.102  The plaintiff, an association of taxpayers, alleged that 
the grant of amnesty to a group of casual employees was illegal.  The Court 
of Appeals discerned a “genuine grievance,” but the House of Lords 
unanimously reversed.103  In so doing, their Lordships articulated a two-
stage test.104  Leave would be refused at the first stage to “busybodies” who 
possess no genuine interest whatsoever.105  To succeed at the second stage, 
the applicant then has to demonstrate a strong case on the merits, balanced 
by the degree of his or her concern.106  For Lord Scarman, the Federation 
had failed to adduce any evidence for the breach of a statutory duty and 
therefore lacked “sufficient interest.”107   Lord Wilberforce, in particular, 
asserted that “one taxpayer has no sufficient interest in asking the court to 
investigate the tax affairs of another taxpayer or to complain that the latter 
has been under-assessed.”108  In his view, “an aggregate of individuals each 
of whom has no interest cannot of itself have an interest.”109  This narrow 
reading drew a lament from Lord Diplock, who regretted the “grave lacuna” 
in public law.110  For him, “outdated technical rules” should not obstruct 
“[vindication of] the rule of law.”111  
The latter position has come to be embraced by English judges.  In R. 
v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, ex parte Smedley,112 a taxpayer was permitted to 
                                                   
101 See, e.g., WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 89, at 562. C.f. M.P. JAIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 513 (3d ed. 1989). 
102 See R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex Parte National Federation of Self-employed and 
Small Businesses Ltd., [1982] AC 617 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK) [hereinafter R v. Inland 
Revenue Commissioners]. 
103 R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex Parte National Federation of Self-employed and Small 
Businesses Ltd, [1980] QB 407, 425. 
104 R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, supra note 102 (per Lord Wilberforce. Lords Diplock and 
Scarman agreed. Lord Fraser disagreed.). 
105 Id. at 646. 
106 See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 89, at 591. See also R v. Monopolies and Merger Commission 
ex parte Argyll Group, [1986] 1 W.L.R. 763. 
107 See R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, supra note 102, at 653–55 (Lord Scarman). 
108 Id. at 633 (Lord Wilberforce). 
109 Id. (Lord Wilberforce). 
110 Id. at 644 (Lord Diplock). 
111 Id. (Lord Diplock). 
112 R. v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, ex parte Smedley [1985] 1 QB 657 (UK).  
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challenge the government’s payment of certain sums to the European 
Community and in R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte 
World Development Movement Ltd.,113 a pressure group114 was held to have 
sufficient interest to challenge the disbursement of aid funds for the Pergau 
Dam in Malaysia.  The courts in Singapore appear to have adopted the 
“sufficient interest” test, with applicants having to produce a “prima facie 
case of reasonable suspicion.”115  However, the Chief Justice has suggested 
extra-judicially that this “is not, in my view, also to say that our courts will 
apply the [sufficient interest] test with the same rigour as the U.K. courts.”116  
Additionally, the case law in both Singapore and Malaysia has 
introduced a distinction between public and private rights.117  In Tan Eng 
Hong v. Attorney-General, the appellant sought to have a statute invalidated 
on constitutional grounds.118  The Singapore Court of Appeal clarified that 
“a public right is one which is held and vindicated by public authorities, 
whereas a private right is one which is held and vindicated by a private 
individual.”119  The applicant who wishes to enforce a public right has to 
establish a violation via an injury that is also personal.120  This doctrine 
made an appearance in Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General.121
Jeyaretnam was a member of an opposition party who had sued for 
prerogative orders and declarations against a 4 billion USD contingent loan 
extended by the Monetary Authority of Singapore to the International 
Monetary Fund.122  The Singapore Supreme Court ruled, incidentally, that as 
Jeyaretnam was unable to prove any damage particular to himself, he did not 
have locus standi.123
                                                   
113 R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte World Development Movement Ltd., [1995] 1 
WLR 386 (UK). 
114 A pressure group is similar to a lobby or interest group.  
115 Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin Linda [2001] 1 SLR 133; see also In re Lim Chor Pee, 
ex parte Law Society of Singapore [1985–1986] SLR 998. 
116 Chan Sek Keong, supra note 88, at 481. 
117 See Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 M.L.J. 12 (the Malaysian Supreme Court 
declined to follow the liberal approach of English cases, attributing it to the new wording of the English 
Rules of the Supreme Court). 
118 Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General, [2012] SGCA 45, http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-
singapore/case-law/free-law/court-of-appeal-judgments/14979-tan-eng-hong-v-attorney-general-2012-sgca-
45. 
119 Id. at para. 69. 
120 See id.  
121 Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2012] SGHC 2010. 
122 Id. (Jeyaretnam contended that the concurrence of the President had not been manifested, contrary 
to article 144 of the Singapore Constitution).  
123 The Supreme Court of Singapore has two divisions; the higher one is the Court of Appeal and the 
lower one is the High Court. 
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Table 3:  Summary of Singapore 
Test Cases
Interest ¾ Sufficient interest
¾ At the first stage, applicant must 
have genuine interest 
¾ At the second stage, applicant has 
to make out “prima facie case of 
reasonable suspicion” 
¾ Injury has to be personal  
¾ Lai Swee Lin Linda (adopts the 
sufficient interest test) 
¾ Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew
(applicant seeking to enforce public 
right also has to demonstrate 
special injury) 
Action/
Entity 
¾ Public nature of the power being 
exercised 
¾ Yeap Wai Kong (reprimand of a 
company by the stock exchange is a 
public function) 
Between 1957 and 2009, there were 79 judicial review cases reported, or an 
average of 1.5 cases per year. 124   Although the citizenry has grown 
increasingly conscious and assertive of its rights, 125  the practice and 
discourse has generally been partial to a non-adversarial relationship 
between the executive and the judiciary, with the latter supporting the 
former in the mission of good governance.126  There has not been a move 
towards a relaxation of locus standi rules. 
C. China 
The rise of administrative litigation in China coincided with the legal 
and economic reforms of the early 1980s, as the new proprietors of 
privately-held corporations acquired both the incentives and the wherewithal 
to seek judicial reversal of unfavorable administrative decisions.127  Since 
the passage of the Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic 
of China of 1989 128  (more accurately translated as the Administrative 
Litigation Law, or ALL), the last two decades have witnessed a steady 
increase in the number of administrative cases filed by Chinese citizens.129  
                                                   
124 Chan Sek Keong, supra note 88, at 474 (relief was granted in 22 of the 79 cases). 
125 See Yuen-C Tham, When Citizens Take the Government to Court, THE STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2014, at 37 (Sing.).  
126 See, e.g., Tan Boon Teik, Judicial Review, SING. L.R. 70 (1988); Chan Sek Keong, supra note 88. 
See also Thio Li-Ann, supra note 92, at 203–04 (“In Singapore, the government ethos of efficiency and 
maintaining public order provides the backdrop to the operation and development of administrative law.  
The judicial predilection for the utilitarian concerns of efficiency, economy, and effectiveness is evident 
from the case law.”). 
127 Susan Finder, Like Throwing an Egg Against a Stone—Administrative Litigation in the People's 
Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE. L. 1, 6–9 (1989). 
128 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅ ) 
[Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?Lib=law&Id=1204&keyword= 
(China) [hereinafter Administrative Procedure Law].
129 See infra Figure 3. 
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The results of a survey conducted in 2010 show that administrative cases 
commenced between 1987 and 2010 may be classified into four main 
categories: those involving public security, issues related to urban 
construction, land disputes, and labor disputes.  The concentration of 
lawsuits within these subject matters not only reveals the most salient 
interests and concerns of ordinary people, but also reflects the influence of 
“standing to sue” as articulated in Article 2,130 Article 11,131 and Article 
12 132  of the ALL.  To bring suit against an administrative agency, a 
prospective plaintiff must establish that: 1) the challenged administrative 
action directly affected the rights and duties of particular individuals, 
corporations, or other organizations; 2) the plaintiff suffered an injury-in-
fact that infringed upon a lawful right and interest; and 3) the administrative 
agency was susceptible to suit.133  
                                                   
130 Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 128, at Art. 2 (“A Citizen, A legal person or other 
organizations have the right to litigate a lawsuit to the people's courts in accordance with this Law once 
they consider that a concrete administrative action by administrative organs or personnels infringe their 
lawful rights and interests.”). 
131 Id. at Art. 11 (“The people's courts shall accept suits brought by citizens, legal persons or other 
organizations against any of the following specific administrative acts: (1) an administrative sanction, such 
as detention, fine, rescission of a license or permit, order to suspend production or business or confiscation 
of property, which one refuses to accept; (2) a compulsory administrative measure, such as restricting 
freedom of the person or the sealing up, seizing or freezing of property, which one refuses to accept; (3) 
infringement upon one's managerial decision-making powers, which is considered to have been perpetrated 
by an administrative organ; (4) refusal by an administrative organ to issue a permit or license, which one 
considers oneself legal qualified to apply for, or its failure to respond to the application; (5) refusal by an 
administrative organ to perform its statutory duty of protecting one's rights of the person and of property, as 
one has applied for, or its failure to respond to the application; (6) cases where an administrative organ is 
considered to have failed to issue a pension according to law; (7) cases where an administrative organ is 
considered to have illegally demanded the performance of duties; and (8) cases where an administrative 
organ is considered to have infringed upon other rights of the person and of property. Apart from the 
provisions set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the people's courts shall accept other administrative suits 
which may be brought in accordance with the provisions of relevant laws and regulations.”). 
132 Id. at Art. 12 (“The people's courts shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal persons or other 
organizations against any of the following matters: (1) acts of the state in areas like national defence and 
foreign affairs; (2) administrative rules and regulations, regulations, or decisions and orders with general 
binding force formulated and announced by administrative organs; (3) decisions of an administrative organ 
on awards or punishments for its personnel or on the appointment or relief of duties of its personnel; (4) 
specific administrative acts that shall, as provided for by law, be finally decided by an administrative 
organ.”). 
133 He Haibo, Xingzheng Fazhi, Women Haiyou Duoyuan [How Far from Administrative Legalism], 6 
ZENGFA LUNTAN [TRIB. POL. SCI. AND L.] 25, 40–41 (2013). 
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Figure 3:  The Number of Administrative Cases Accepted and Judged 
Between 1988 and 2013 in China134
First, the challenged administrative acts must directly affect the rights 
and duties of particular individuals, corporations, or other organizations.135  
                                                   
134 This chart is drawn from data between 1989 and 2014 in the Law Yearbook of China, an annual 
publication. Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 759, 771, 802, 819, 835, 849, 862, 
876, 891,  ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (1989–98); Zhongguo Faxuehui 
(ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ [China Law Society] 1023, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] 
(1999); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 1211,  ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ
⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2000); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 1258,  
ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2001); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ
) [China Law Society] 777–78, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2002); 
Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 645, 675,  ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻ
ᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2003–04); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 615, 616,  
ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2005); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ
) [China Law Society] 487,  ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2006); 
Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 593–94, 617, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅
ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2007–08); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 1001, 
ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2009); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ
) [China Law Society] 920, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2010); 
Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 1052, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ
䢤 ) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2011); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ ) [China Law Society] 1066, ZHƿ
ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2012); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ
) [China Law Society] 1211,  ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2013). 
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In other words, a prospective plaintiff is entitled to commence an 
administrative suit only when the action in question implicates a specific
person or situation.  The term is emphasized in Article 2 of the ALL in 
contradistinction to internal administrative acts136 and abstract administrative 
acts,137 both of which are immune from judicial oversight.138
In 2000, the Chinese Supreme Court promulgated “The Interpretation 
of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of ‘Administrative 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China,’” 139  to clarify the 
definition of administrative acts not subject to legal challenge as stated in 
Article 12 of ALL.  Administrative acts not subject to legal challenges 
include internal administrative acts, abstract administrative acts, 
administrative guidance, and certain official certificates.140
Internal administrative acts are defined as the decisions of an 
administrative organ regarding awards, punishments, appointments, or relief 
of duty applicable solely to its own personnel.141  A case involving the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) provides a suitable illustration.  On 
November 20, 1988, PBOC dissolved its Jiangxi branch and replaced it with 
the newly-founded Wuhan branch.  The Wuhan branch resolved to change 
the name of the Cadre School of People’s Bank of Jiangxi Province and to 
                                                                                                                                                       
135 See Song Yafang, Juti Xingzheng Xingwei Gainian de Zaisuli [Rethinking the Concept of Specific 
Administrative Act], 4 HENAN SHENG ZHENGFA GUANLI GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF HENAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND LAW] 4 (2006). 
136 Article 12 of ALL states that “[t]he people's courts shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal 
persons or other organizations against . . . decisions of an administrative organ on awards or punishments 
for its personnel or on the appointment or relief of duties of its personnel.”  Administrative Procedure Law, 
supra note 128, at Art. 12. 
137 Id. (“The people's courts shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal persons or other 
organizations against … administrative rules and regulations, regulations, or decisions and orders with 
general binding force formulated and announced by administrative organs.”). 
138 See Guan Baoying, Lun Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei yu Juti Xingzheng Zhuti de Fenli
[Separating the Main Body of Abstract Administrative Acts and Specific Administrative Acts], 4 Falv 
Pinglun 3 [Law Review] (2006).  
139 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu ZhixingǉZhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong FaǊ
Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi, (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾᢗ㹼ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ䀓䟺) 
[The Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of “Administrative Procedure 
Law of the People’s Republic of China”], (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 8, 2000, effective Mar. 
10, 2000), http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/NewLaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=26982 [hereinafter 
Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure Law].  
140 Id. at Art. 3–5; Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 126, at Art. 7 (“The people's courts 
shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal persons or other organizations against . . . decisions of an 
administrative organ on awards or punishments for its personnel or on the appointment or relief of duties of 
its personnel.”); see also He Haibo, supra note 133, at 40. 
141 Interpretation of Several Problems referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure 
Law, supra note 139, at Art. 6. 
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appoint Jiangxi Financial College to manage the school’s employees, funds, 
and fixed assets.  The Cadre School of People’s Bank of Jiangxi Province 
then initiated an administrative suit against the “Notice Related to the 
Matters of the Former Cadre School of People’s Bank of Jiangxi Province” 
issued by Wuhan Branch of the PBOC.142  The Intermediate Court of Jiangxi 
Province found the reorganization undertaken by the Wuhan branch to be an 
internal administrative action and accordingly dismissed the appeal.143  
As defined by the Supreme People’s Court, abstract administrative 
acts are rules, regulations, decisions, and orders that are rules of general 
applicability that are formulated and announced by administrative organs.144  
The courts may never review abstract administrative acts.  One common 
example is “red-titled documents,” or hongtou wenjian. 145  These are 
directives of departments subordinate to the state council, local people’s 
governments at or above the county level and their respective departments, 
or town administrations.  They are not included in the body of statutes, 
administrative regulations, and rules.  Xinhua reported that in 2005, sixty-
eight “red-titled documents” issued by eleven cities and eighteen 
administrative agencies of Heilongjiang Province were contrary to law.146  In 
addition, a study conducted in Anhui Province found that as of 2004, sixty 
percent of the 110 provincial-level “red-titled documents” were inconsistent 
                                                   
142 Jiangxi Sheng Renmin Yinhang Ganbu Xuexiao Su Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Wuhan Fenhang 
Jinron Jigou Tiaozheng Xingzheng Chuli Jueding An (⊏㾯ⴱӪ≁䬦㹼ᒢ䜘ᆖṑ䇹ѝഭӪ≁䬦㹼↖≹࠶
㹼䠁㶽ᵪᶴ䈳ᮤ㹼᭯༴⨶ߣᇊṸ) [The Cadre School of People’s Bank of Jiangxi Province v. Wuhan 
Branch of People’s Bank of China], Dec. 12, 2005 NANCHANG INTERM. PEOPLE’S CT., 
http://hubeigy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=4110. 
143 Id.
144 Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure 
Law, supra note 139, at Art. 3. 
145 See Hongtou Wenjian Pingdian (㓒ཤ᮷Ԧ䇴⛩) [The Notes of Red-Titled Document], (Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ
ǉ ≁ ѫ ᭯ ⋫ Ǌ ઘ ࠺  [PEOPLE’S DAILY: DEMOCRATIC POLITICS WEEKLY] (Jan. 2, 2008), 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/114987/ (explaining that “red-titled documents” are so named 
because they usually bear red titles and stamps; these documents are issued by both central and local 
administrative agencies to regulate the duties and rights of citizens under their jurisdiction); see also
Hongtou Wenjian Shiyu Nanbei Chao de Xiwei Shiqi (㓒ཤ᮷Ԧ࿻ҾইेᵍⲴ㾯兿ᰦᵏ) [Red-titled 
Documents Originated from Wei Western Period of Nanbei Dynasty], (Ӫ≁ᰕᣕǉ≁ѫ᭯⋫Ǌઘ࠺
[PEOPLE’S DAILY: DEMOCRATIC POLITICS WEEKLY] (Jan. 2, 2008), http://history.people.com.cn/n/2014/07
15/c372330-25283205.html. 
146 Zengshuang Gao, Rang Hongtou Wenjian Yuanli “Bawang Tiaokuan” [Making “Red-titled 
Document” Stay Away from “Inequality Clauses”], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 11, 2005, 
http://www.hlj.xinhuanet.com/xw/2005-07/11/content_4613159.htm. 
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with applicable laws and regulations.147  Although contrary to law, these 
abstract administrative acts were not reviewed by courts.  
There are a few other matters besides abstract and internal 
administrative acts that cannot be reviewed by the courts.148  For example, 
the decision of governmental bodies to grant funding for the support of 
certain local corporations, often classified as administrative guidance, does 
not qualify as a specific administrative act149 because it is not binding and 
has no direct legal consequences. 150   In addition, an official certificate 
pronouncing the recognized cause of and liability for a fire is not subject to 
review because it does not alter the existing rights and duties of the involved 
parties.151
The injury-in-fact has to infringe upon a plaintiff’s “lawful right and 
interest” for the plaintiff to have standing to sue in China.  Article 11 further 
limits the range of “lawful rights and interests”: the court should only accept 
an administrative case if “an administrative organ is considered to have 
infringed upon rights of the person and of property.”152  Thus, other rights, 
such as those associated with environmental damage and degradation may 
not be litigated under the ALL.  In 2001, two professors from Southeast 
China University alleged that a viewing tower built on the peak of Purple 
Mountain was inimical to the preservation of natural and historical sites and 
                                                   
147 E.g., The Industrial and Commercial Bureau of Anhui (ICB) promulgated a red-titled document 
that required businesses engaged in advertising to be certified as “credible organizations” so as to avoid a 
presumption of false advertising.  This was found by the Legal Affairs Office of Anhui to be illegal because 
it bypassed the legislative process to impose additional obligations on local businesses. Keqiang Tao, 
Renmin Shiping: Haiyou Duoshao “Hongtou Wenjian” De Weifa Tiaokuan Meiyou Jiuzheng [How Many 
the Illegal Provisions of “Red Tapes” Have Not Been Corrected?], PEOPLE’S DAILY, Nov. 17, 2004, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1033/2995065.html. 
148 See Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of Administrative 
Procedure Law, supra note 139. 
149 Dianshi Longsheng Shichai Chang Bufu Fuding Shi Renmin Zhengfu Xingzheng Fuyou Fuqiang 
Cuoshi An (⛩⸣䲶㜌⸣ᶀলнᴽ⾿唾ᐲӪ≁᭯ᓌ㹼᭯ᢦՈᢦᕪ᧚ᯭṸ㸧 [Diantou Longsheng Stone 
Co., Ltd. v. Fuding Municipal People’s Government] (Fuding Local Ct. July 19,2001), http://old.chinacourt
.org/html/article/200211/04/17116.shtml. 
150 Id.
151 See Huangmou Su Chongqing Shi Wanzhou Qu Gongan Xiaofang Zhidui (哴Ḁ䇹䟽ᒶᐲзᐎ४
ޜᆹ⎸䱢᭟䱏) [Huang v. Wanzhou Dist. Fire Department] (Chongqing Wanzhou NO.2 Interm. People’s 
Ct. Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.cq2zfy.gov.cn/information/displaycont.asp?newsid=14639.  See also
Gongan Bu Guanyu Dui Huozai Shigu Zeren Rending Bufu Shifou Shu Xingzheng Susong Shouan Fanwei 
De Pifu (ޜᆹ䜘ޣҾሩ⚛⚮һ᭵䍓ԫ䇔ᇊнᴽᱟ੖኎㹼᭯䇹䇬ਇṸ㤳തⲴᢩ༽) [Official Reply of 
Ministry of Public Security about Whether the Recognition Certificate of Fire Liability Has Standing to Sue 
in Administrative Litigations] (promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security, effective Mar. 20, 2000),
http://www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/fg22598/55390.shtml. 
152 Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 128, at Art. 6. 
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harmed the environmental benefits of the public.153  They sued the Nanjing 
Planning Bureau for failing to respect their lawful property rights based on 
the argument that they bought an annual tour ticket for Purple Mountain.154
However, the Nanjing Municipal Intermediate Court did not accept the suit, 
citing insufficient injury-in fact.155  This rejection exemplifies two common 
hurdles to establish the infringement of a “lawful right and interest”: the 
non-recognition of political and social rights, and the burden of 
demonstrating that a plaintiff was directly affected by the administrative 
action. 
As a general matter, personal and property rights in Chinese law do 
not encompass political and social rights, even those ostensibly guaranteed 
by the Constitution.156  The withholding of approval for the establishment of 
a social organization, cancellation of organizational registration, and 
restrictions on demonstrations are generally not grievances that may be 
brought into the courtroom.157  In administrative cases implicating political 
                                                   
153 Wu Weixing, Lun Huanjingquan De Sifa Baozhang [Judicial Guarantee of Environmental Rights], 
THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WUHAN UNIVERSITY (June 29, 2003), 
http://www.riel.whu.edu.cn/article.asp?id=25509. 
154 Id.
155 Id.  See also Shi Jianhui, Gu Dasong Su Nanjingshi Guihuaju Weifa Xingzheng An (ᯭᔪ䖹ǃ亮
བྷᶮ䇹ইӜᐲ㿴ࡂተ䘍⌅㹼᭯Ṹ[The Case of Shi Jianhui, Gu Dasong v. Nanjing Planning Bureau 
Against Illegal Administrative Acts] (Nov. 16, 2004), RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
WUHAN UNIVERSITY, http://www.riel.whu.edu.cn/article.asp?id=26404. 
156 There is no constitutional court in China.  Although the Chinese Constitution is accorded 
deference both publicly and officially, in practice, it is an exhortatory document that is not applied or 
interpreted.  The origin of this phenomenon can be traced back to an official reply from the Supreme 
People’s Court in 1955, which stated that the “the Constitution is the fundamental law of the state and has 
supreme legal authority. . . . It does not include the regulation on how to convict and punish in the field of 
criminal law. Thus, we agree with the judicial decision made by your court, the Constitution shall not be 
applied as the legal basis of conviction and punishment in the criminal cases.” Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
Guanyu Zai Xingshi Panjue Zhong Buyi Yuanyin Xianfa Zuo Lunzui Kexing De Yiju De Fuhan㸦ᴰ儈Ӫ
≁⌅䲒ޣҾ൘ࡁһࡔߣѝнᇌᨤᕅᇚ⌅֌䇪㖚、ࡁⲴ׍ᦞⲴ༽࠭㸧[The Official Reply of Supreme 
Court Regarding to the Statement that Constitution Shall Not be Applied to Be the Legal Basis of 
Conviction and Punishment in the Criminal Cases] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. July 20, 1955, 
effective July 20, 1955), http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/1955/07/id/142.shtml.  The Chinese 
Constitution has only been applied to interpret a case in two instances, and has subsequently disappeared 
from all other written judgments. See Qi Yuling Su Chen Xiaoqi Maoming Dingti Dao Luqu Qide 
Zhongzhuan Xuexiao Jiudu Qinfan Xingmingquan Shoujiaoyu De Quanli Sunhai Peichang An㸦喀⦹㤃䇹
䱸ᲃ⩚߂਽亦ᴯࡠᖅਆަⲴѝуᆖṑቡ䈫ץ⣟ဃ਽ᵳǃਇᮉ㛢Ⲵᵳ࡙ᦏᇣ䎄گṸ㸧[Qi Yuling v. 
Chen Xiaoqi], (Shandong High People’s Ct., Aug. 23, 2001) 㸪 CIL.C.21952 (EN) (PKUlaw), 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=pfnl&Gid=117462464&keyword= 滸 ⋢ ⱎ
&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate; Yuandong Xie ( 䉒 䘌 ь ) Shi Yuequan Haishi Hufa 
ZhongziGuansi De Yiwai Zhanfang (ᱟ䎺ᵳ䘈ᱟᣔ⌅⿽ᆀᇈਨⲴ᜿ཆ㔭᭮) [The Analysis of Zhong Zi 
Case: Overstepping Authority or Protecting Law], (Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ *!PEOPLE’S DAILY, (Nov. 26, 2003), 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/14528/2213325.html. 
157 He Haibo, supra note 133, at 40-41. 
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or social rights, standing may be granted only if specifically authorized by 
statute. 158   For instance, Article 33 of the “Regulation of the People's 
Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information” authorizes 
courts to hear citizen requests for information based on the violation of a 
political right without having to inquire into the existence of a direct 
harm.159  In 2008, municipal-level governments handled 683 petitions for 
administrative reconsideration of Open Government Information (OGI) 
requests.160
It is also important to note that Article 12 of the “Interpretation of 
Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of ‘Administrative 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China’” further requires that the 
purported infringement directly affect a litigant’s personal and property 
rights. 161   Thus, citizens may not question governmental expenditures 
through administrative litigation on the theory that they are taxpayers.162  For 
instance, in 2006, a farmer sued Changning Municipal Financial Bureau for 
purchasing two unbudgeted cars.163  The Changning Municipal Intermediate 
Court declined to receive the lawsuit on the basis that the act in question did 
not directly concern the plaintiff.164  
                                                   
158 Id. 
159 Article 33 of Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government 
Information states, “where any citizen, legal person or any other organization believes that a specific 
administrative act committed by an administrative organ in carrying out government information disclosure 
work has infringed upon his/its legal rights and interests, he/it may apply for administrative reconsideration 
or bring an administrative lawsuit according to law.”  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Xinxi 
Gongkai Tiaoli㸦ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ᭯ᓌؑ᚟ޜᔰᶑֻ㸧[Regulation of the People's Republic of China on 
the Disclosure of Government Information] (promulgated by St. Council, Apr. 5, 2007, effective May 1, 
2008), Art. 33, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=90387&lib=law. 
160 Jamie P. Horsley, Update on China’s Open Government Information Regulations: Surprising 
Public Demand Yielding Some Positive Results, FREEDOMINFO.ORG Apr. 23, 2010, 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CLOGI_Update_for_freedominfo_Horsley_articl
e_4-6-10.pdf. 
161 Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure 
Law, supra note 139, at Art. 7. 
162 See Jiang Shilin Su Henan Sheng Changning Xian Caizhengju An (㪻⸣᷇䇹⒆ইⴱᑨᆱ৯䍒᭯
ተṸ) [Shilin Jiang v. Changning Municipal Financial Bureau]; see also Jiang Shilin Su Changning Shi 
Caizheng Ju Weifa Gouche An (㪻⸣᷇䇹ᑨᆱᐲ䍒᭯ተ䘍⌅䍝䖖Ṹ) [Shilin Jiang v. Changning 
Municipal Financial Bureau against unbudgeted cars’ purchase], http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-12-
29/183711917743.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2015); He Haibo, supra note 133, at 41. 
163 Id.
164 Id.; see also Huang Yuanjian (哴ݳڕ), Gongyi Susong Yu Caizheng Jiandu—Jiang Shilin Su 
Hunan Sheng Changzhou Shi Caizheng Ju An (ޜ⳺䇹䇬о䍒᭯ⴁⶓü㪻⸣᷇䇹⒆ইⴱᑨᆱᐲ䍒᭯ተ
Ṹ) [Public Interests Litigations and Financial Supervision: Jiang Shilin v. Changning Municipal Financial 
Bureau], Beijing Yingxiang Lushi Shiwu Suo (ेӜᐲѹ⍮ᖻᐸһ࣑ᡰ>BEIJING IMPACT LAW FIRM] 
(Apr. 4, 2007), http://www.bjimpact.org/Article.asp?ArticleID=280. 
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Third, the authority complained of must be susceptible to suit.165  The 
“Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of 
‘Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China’” 
classifies all organizations exercising an administrative power delegated in 
accordance with the law as administrative organs.166  In 1997, Chen Jianeng 
sued the Organization Department of Sichuan Province167 after he had been 
reassigned by his employer, the Sichuan Petroleum Administration, as a 
result of the defendant’s action.168  The Supreme People’s Court dismissed 
Chen’s appeal on standing grounds. 169   Even though the Organization 
Department of Sichuan Province’s decision would probably have been 
unreviewable as an internal administrative act, the court did not reach that 
question, basing its verdict on the definition of administrative organs.170  The 
Organization Department of Sichuan Province is apparently not an 
organization legally vested with administrative power.171  The cases also 
suggest that Chinese courts would exempt some forms of public associations 
                                                   
165 Although the ALL does not explicitly qualify the right of action against administrative acts of the 
CCP, these cases rarely gain standing as a matter of practice. The Chinese State Council, as the highest 
administrative organ, possesses a unique legal status, distinctive from other administrative bodies, and is 
only rarely vulnerable to administrative litigation. Article XIV of Administrative Reconsideration Law of 
the People’s Republic of China authorizes the State Council to function as a court of law and to render a 
final ruling on administrative reconsideration appeals. “The applicant who refuses to accept the 
administrative reconsideration decision may bring a suit before a people's court; or apply to the State 
Council for a ruling, and the State Council shall make a final ruling according to the provisions of this Law.ā
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (2009 Xiuzheng) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ㹼᭯༽䇞⌅˄2009
ᒤ؞↓˅) [Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China (2009 Amendment)] 
(promulgated by Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Aug. 27, 2009, effective Aug. 27, 
2009) Art. 14, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=167114&lib=law.  To some extent, this prevented the 
Chinese State Council from being named as a defendant in an administrative suit. See He Haibo, supra note 
133, at 40–41. 
166 Article 1 states that, “a citizen, a legal person or other organizations have the right to litigate a 
lawsuit to the people’s courts once they consider that a concert administrative action by administrative 
organs or other organizations that exercise administrative power.”  Interpretation of Several Problems 
Referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 137, at Art. 1. 
167 Because the People’s Republic of China is a party-dominated state, the Organization Department 
has an enormous amount of control over personnel within the PRC. The Organization Department is 
indispensable to the CPC’s power, and the key to its hold over personnel throughout every level of 
government and industry. It is one of the key agencies of the Central Committee, along with the Central 
Propaganda Department and International Liaison Department. See SICHUAN ZU GONG WANG (ഋᐍ㓴ᐕ
㖁 [ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT OF SICHUAN], http://www.gcdr.gov.cn/info/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
168 Chen Jianeng Su Sichuan Shengwei Zuzhi Bu Qinquan Shangsu An (䱸హ㜭䇹ഋᐍⴱင㓴㓷䜘
ץᵳк䇹Ṹ) [Jianeng Chen v. The Organization Ministry of Sichuan Province], (promulgated by Sup. 
People’s Ct., 1997), http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=pfnl&Gid=118324465&keyword=旰჆
⬟ &EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate; see also http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pfnl_118324465.ht 
ml?keywords=䱸హ㜭䇹ഋᐍⴱင㓴㓷䜘&match=Exact. 
169 Id.
170 Id. 
171 Id.  
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from review.  For example, in Changchun Yatai v. Chinese Football Council, 
the Beijing Municipal Second Intermediate Court concluded that the plaintiff 
could not contest the decisions of a “self-regulating organization.”172  This is 
despite the fact that the Council discharges an administrative function under 
the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Physical Culture and 
Sports.”173  
The number of administrative cases handled by the Chinese courts has 
grown in the twenty-six years following the introduction of the ALL in 1989.  
Despite this, they make up only a minor fraction of the caseload of Chinese 
courts.  Between 1998 and 2002, there were only 463,328 administrative 
cases, accounting for a mere 1.73% of all cases decided by the Chinese 
judiciary in these five years. 174   The three elements summarized below 
partially reflect the relatively narrow standing granted to plaintiffs under 
Chinese administrative law.  
                                                   
172 See Han Yong, Anli Fenxi Changchuan Yatai Julebu Su Zhongguo Zuxie Xingzheng Chufa 
Budang (Ṹֻ࠶᷀䮯᱕ӊ⌠ءҀ䜘䇹ѝഭ䏣ॿ㹼᭯༴㖊нᖃ) [The Case Analysis: Changchun Yatai v. 
Chinese Football Council] (Jun. 2006), TIYU YU FALÜ JIUFEN ANLI PINGXI [SPORTS AND LAW: CASE 
ANALYSIS ON SPORTS DISPUTES], http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_33179.shtml (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
173 The State practices classified administration of sports competitions at different levels. 
Comprehensive national games shall be administered by the administrative department for physical culture 
and sports under the State Council or by the administrative department for physical culture and sports under 
the State Council in conjunction with other relevant organizations. National competition of an individual 
sport shall be administered by the national association of the said sport. Measures for the administration of 
local comprehensive sports games and local individual sport competitions shall be formulated by the local 
people's governments. See Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Tiyufa (ѝഭӪ≁ޡ઼ഭփ㛢⌅) [Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Physical Culture and Sports] (promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Nat'l
People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1995, effective Oct.1, 1995) (China), http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?
Db=chl&Gid=12674&keyword=փ㛢⌅&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate. 
174 Jiangxisheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Ketizu 㸦⊏㾯ⴱ儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒䈮仈㓴㸧[The Research 
Group of Jiangxi Provincial Higher People’s Court], Xingzheng Susong Fa Shishi Wenti De Shizheng Fenxi 
Yu Sikao Jianlun Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa De Xiugai 㸦㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅ᇎᯭ䰞仈
Ⲵᇎ䇱࠶᷀оᙍ㘳˖ެ䇪ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅ǊⲴ؞᭩) [The Empirical Study of the 
Implementation of “Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China”], 5 J. L.
APPLICATION 38, 39 (2004). 
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Table 4:  Summary of China 
China (Pre-2014) China (Post-2014)
Interest ¾ Lawful right and interest
¾ Limited to person and property 
¾ Direct harm, i.e. no interest as a 
taxpayer 
¾ Other political rights as authorized 
by statute 
¾ Includes open information, social 
security, and educational rights 
Action ¾ Specific administrative acts
¾ Excludes internal or abstract 
administrative acts 
¾ Leaves out administrative guidance  
¾ Number of enumerated categories 
of cases increased from 8 to 12 
Entity ¾ Organizations exercising an 
administrative power delegated by 
law 
¾ Organization empowered by a law, 
regulation, or rule 
The National People’s Congress (NPC) has recently promulgated 
amendments to the ALL, effective May 1, 2015, that formally relax some of 
these standing requirements.175  The rights that may be vindicated through 
administrative litigation are no longer restricted to those implicating persons 
or property and now include open information, social security, and 
educational rights.176  Also, administrative acts taken by an organization 
empowered by a law, regulation, or rule may now be the subject of suit.177  
In addition, citizens challenging an administrative action may 
simultaneously file a request for review of the relevant regulation.178  Finally, 
even though the types of reviewable administrative cases are defined 
through enumeration rather than exclusion, the listed categories have 
                                                   
175 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (2014 Xiuzheng) (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ㹼᭯䇹
䇬⌅ (2014 ؞↓)) [Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014 Amendment)] 
(promulgated by Nat’l Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015), Art. 7, 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=239820&lib=law [hereinafter Administrative Litigation Law].  
176 Ying Songnian, Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai De Liangdian Yu Qidai (ǉ㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅Ǌ؞᭩ⲴӞ
⛩оᵏᖵ) [The Insights and Prospective of the Amendment of Administrative Litigation Law], LEGAL 
DAILY, Jan. 28, 2015; see also Tian Yong su Beijing Keji Daxue (⭠≨䇹ेӜ、ᢰབྷᆖ) [Tian Yong v 
Beijing Univ. of Sci. and Tech.], Sup. People’s Ct. Judicial Comm., Guidance Case No. 38 (Sup. People’s 
Ct. 1999) (protecting claimants’ educational rights; decided in February 1999 and selected to be a Guiding 
Case on January 7, 2015), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/12/id/1524355.shtml. 
177  Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 175, at Art. 2 (“The term ‘administrative action’ as 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph includes administrative actions taken by an organization empowered 
by a law, regulation, or rule.”).  See also Tian Yong su Beijing Keji Daxue (⭠≨䇹ेӜ、ᢰབྷᆖ) [Tian 
Yong v Beijing Univ. of Sci. and Tech.], Sup. People’s Ct. Judicial Comm., Guidance Case No. 38 (Sup. 
People’s Ct. 1999), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/12/id/1524355.shtml (confirming higher 
education institutes can be sued as defendants in administrative litigations; decided February 1999 and 
selected to be a Guiding Case on January 7, 2015). 
178 Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 175, at Art. 53 (this only applies to the regulations of a 
department of the State Council or by a local people’s government or department). 
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expanded from eight179 to twelve.180  In April 2015, the Supreme People’s 
Court issued a judicial interpretation to guide courts in applying the 2014 
amendments.181  For example, a court should accept a case if it is otherwise 
unable to come to a decision in seven days. 182   The document further 
suggests that courts give appropriate advice to organizations responsible for 
illegal “red-titled documents” and to apprise a supervising body, such as the 
local government or the administrative agency at the next level of 
government, of its recommendations.183  While these changes are intended to 
encourage administrative litigation, it is still too early to assess their 
practical impact. 
IV. COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
The scope of this paper has compelled us to paint in broad strokes, but 
looking to both the state of the law of standing as well as trends in each case 
study country, there are a few salient observations.  It is probably fair to say 
that for much of the last decade, prior to the 2014 amendment to the ALL, 
administrative litigation standing was broader in Japan than in China.  First, 
only specific administrative acts were reviewable in Chinese courts under 
the 1989 statute.  In particular, non-binding decisions are not subject to suit.  
The doctrinal equivalent in Japan is that of shobunsei.  However, Takano, 
decided in 2004, suggests that administrative guidance in Japan may no 
longer be as insulated from judicial review as it once was.184   Second, 
Japanese law has gradually come to embrace a broader conception of “legal 
interest.”  As codified in the 2004 amendments to the ACLL and illustrated 
by the Odakyǌ Railroad Case, one may now sue on the basis of a legal 
                                                   
179 Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 128, at Art. 11. 
180 Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 175, at Art. 12. For example, decisions on 
expropriation or requisition or decisions on compensation for expropriation or requisition can be challenged 
in courts. See Xuan Yi Cheng Deng Su Zhejiang Sheng Quzhou Shi Guotu Ziyuan Ju (ᇓᠯᡀㅹ䇹⎉⊏ⴱ
㺒ᐎᐲഭ൏䍴Ⓚተ) [Xuan Yi Cheng v. Quzhou City Land Res. Bureau], Sup. People’s Ct. Judicial 
Comm., Guidance Case No. 38 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2003), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/12/i
d/1524380.shtml, (holding that the administrative decision about the right to use a land was illegal; 
judgment made in August 2003 and selected to be a Guiding Case on December 25, 2014).  
181 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Susong Fa” Ruogan 
Wenti De Jieshi (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ䀓䟺) [The 
Interpretation of Supreme People’s Court on Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of 
“Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China”] (promulgated by Supreme People’s 
Ct., Apr. 22, 2015, effective May 1, 2015), http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=24745
3&EncodingName=. 
182 Id. at Art. 1. 
183 Id. at Art. 2, 20–21. 
184 Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 15, 2004, 59 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 1661 
(Japan), http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=760. 
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interest that is protected by laws and regulations relevant to the ones 
governing the administration disposition.  The court not only has to consider 
the language of the statute, but also its overall “purport and purpose.”185  In 
contrast, the lawful interests that may form the basis for an administrative 
case in China must involve persons or property (unless special dispensation 
had been granted by legislative fiat). 186   Third, the Japanese ACLL 
recognizes a category of “public suits,” or minshǌ soshǀ, that dispenses with 
subjective legal interest as a requirement for standing.  The statutory 
availability of such suits has exposed the operational information and 
finances of local governments to citizen scrutiny.  Although Chinese law has 
also dispensed with some of the elements of standing when it comes to OGI, 
taxpayers may not sue local authorities for restitution of misused public 
funds. 
The comparison with Singapore is more challenging.  There are no 
legal constraints on the type of injury that must be suffered for a complaint 
to be validly heard in Singapore, save that it be personal to the complainant.  
Furthermore, as laid down in Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin 
Linda, the courts in Singapore utilize the nature test in addition to the source 
test to determine which bodies are subject to judicial review.187  But the 
Singapore Parliament has never authorized freedom of information statutes 
or taxpayer suits.  It is also clear that such cases would be rejected in the 
Singapore courts for want of standing, as demonstrated by Jeyaretnam 
Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General.188  While the sufficient interest test 
(“prima facie case of reasonable suspicion”) obliges the judge to reach the 
merits before ascertaining locus standi, precedent in this area of Singapore 
law is, unfortunately, sparse.189  However, the Chief Justice’s extra-judicial 
comments hint at the possibility of a stricter standard than that applied by the 
English courts.  In the absence of well-developed case law in this common 
law jurisdiction, one can only hazard a guess that the legal barriers to 
standing are as imposing in Singapore as they are in China.  
The previous observations juxtaposed the state of the law in each of 
the three countries’ systems.  However, it is also instructive to adopt a 
dynamic rather than static perspective.  This approach looks at how the law 
has evolved in each of the countries studied.  The literature reveals that 
                                                   
185 Narufumi Kadomatsu, supra note 68 at 156.  See also Yuichero Tsuji, supra note 70, at 354. 
186 Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 128. 
187 See Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin Linda [2001] 1 SLR 133. 
188 Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General [2012] SGCH 2010. 
189 Id. at paras. 10–11. 
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Japan’s standing requirements have experienced significant liberalization 
over the last decade.  In China, very recent amendments to the ALL promise 
to subject a broader class of administrative conduct to judicial review.  In 
contrast, Singapore administrative law has not moved in a similar direction 
and has generally remained static. 
The question then is whether the rational choice tradition explains the 
differences over time between countries.  We observe, first, that the 
executive and the legislature tend to be politically unified in one-party 
dominated states regardless of governmental structure.  In Japan, the Prime 
Minister is the head of government, appointed from members of the 
bicameral Diet.  Because he has to command the confidence of the House of 
Representatives, the Prime Minister usually belongs to the majority party. 
The same is true in Singapore, which inherited the U.K.’s Westminster 
model of parliamentary democracy.  Although the “executive authority of 
Singapore” is vested in the President,190 the Cabinet is tasked with “general 
direction and control of the Government.”191  The Prime Minister presides 
over the Cabinet and appoints its members.192  Since independence in 1965, 
the Prime Minister of Singapore has always been a member of the ruling 
People’s Action Party (PAP).  In China, the Constitution describes the NPC 
as the “highest organ of state power,” overseeing the State Council, the State 
Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate.193  Although there are formally eight other political 
parties that are nominally represented in the NPC, many see the legislature 
as little more than a rubber-stamp for national policy decisions taken by the 
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP).194  
                                                   
190 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 23. 
191 Id. at Art 24. 
192 Id. at Art 28. 
193 XIANFA art. 57 (1982), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=1457&lib=law. 
194 See, e.g., HE WEIFANG, IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE: STRIVING FOR RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 129 
(2012). See also Eric Ip, Judicial Review in China: A Positive Political Economy Analysis, 8 REV. L. &
ECON. 331, 334 (2012). 
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Figure 4:  China’s Political Structure as Implemented195
A second factor that fades in importance in party-dominated states is 
the distinction between common and civil law institutions.  It is said that 
common law judges, being further removed from the administrative arm of 
the state, tend to enjoy more freedom than civil law judges.196  However, 
judicial actors in the countries we have selected tend to be reluctant to 
deviate from the preferences of the political elite.  There is some empirical 
evidence supporting the assertion that Japanese judges who antagonized the 
government were penalized by being rotated to less prestigious positions.197  
In addition, it has been suggested that this internal reluctance to dabble in 
contrarian politics developed as a mechanism to preserve judiciary 
independence.198  In Singapore, a common law jurisdiction, courts display a 
similar passivity when it comes to challenging the State.  A number of 
commentators have noted that the judiciary adheres to a thin conception of 
rule of law,199 a position induced by co-option and internalization of the 
                                                   
195 See, e.g., Zhu Weijing, Charting Chinese Politics, WORLD OF CHINESE (Nov. 29, 2013), 
http://www.theworldofchinese.com/2013/11/charting-chinese-politics/. 
196 See, e.g., Garoupa & Mathews, supra note 2, at 12.  
197 Mark J. Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The 
Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259, 278 (1997).  See also Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative 
Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 263 (Philip S.C. 
Lewis ed., 1994). 
198 See Masaki Abe, The Internal Control of a Bureaucratic Judiciary: The Case of Japan, 23 INT’L J.
SOC. L. 303 (1995). 
199 A thin conception of the rule of law sees rule of law as being procedural in nature; there is rule of 
law if laws are properly enacted, not retroactive, etc. In contrast, a thick conception of the rule of law sees 
rule of law as having a substantive component such as limitations on the powers of the state vis-à-vis the 
individual. 
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ruling party’s communitarian ideology.200  In China, as previously recounted, 
the judiciary is formally subordinate to the legislature.  The president of the 
Supreme People’s Court presents a report to the Politburo Standing 
Committee of the NPC every year.201  The Supreme People’s Court’s 2009 
advice to lower courts to reject any case involving government-initiated 
demolition and relocation is further evidence of politics prevailing over 
law. 202   Thus, one should expect that in these countries, the reach of 
administrative law will be more or less confined to the limits imposed by the 
political leadership, sharpening the salience of PPT for administrative law. 
There are, however, differences between Japan, Singapore, and China 
that could account for variation in how the classes of eligible plaintiffs in 
administrative cases are defined.  First, although the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) in Japan was reelected in every national election from 1955 to 
1990, it has traditionally been, at least by some accounts, a highly 
factionalized unit.203  The defection from the party ranks in the summer of 
1993 dealt the LDP a blow from which it has yet to fully recover.  A no-
confidence vote in the lower house was followed by a reversal in the ensuing 
elections which saw the LDP lose its majority in the House of 
Representatives for the first time.  While the LDP later restored its majority 
in the House of Representatives after the 2005 General Election, it was 
decisively routed in the 2009 House elections by the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ).  In short, by the mid-1990s the specter of electoral competition 
and defeat hung over the LDP.  Conversely, there has been no such pressure 
in Singapore or China.  Although the PAP in Singapore saw its share of the 
popular vote decline between the 2001 and 2006 Parliamentary Elections, 
and again in 2011, there has not been a genuine challenge to its position as 
                                                   
200 See, e.g., Thio Li-ann, Rule of Law within a Non-Liberal “Communitarian” Democracy:  The 
Singapore Experience, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW 183 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004); 
Eugene K.B. Tan, ‘WE’ v. ‘I’: Communitarian Legalism in Singapore, 4 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2002); Tey 
Tsun Hang, Judicial Internalising of Singapore’s Supreme Political Ideology, 40 H.K.L.J. 293 (2010); 
Jothie Rajah, Punishing Bodies, Securing the Nation: How Rule of Law can Legitimate the Urbane 
Authoritarian State, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 945 (2011); Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception 
that Proves Rules Matter, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 73 
(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008); FRANCIS SEOW, BEYOND SUSPICION? THE SINGAPORE 
JUDICIARY XV–XX (2006). 
201 HE WEIFANG, supra note 194.  
202 Id.
203 See, e.g., MARK J. RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL 
MARKETPLACE 59 (1993); BRADLEY M. RICHARDSON, JAPANESE DEMOCRACY: POWER, COORDINATION,
AND PERFORMANCE 74 (1997). 
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the government party.204  The position of the CCP in China has also not been 
meaningfully or realistically threatened.  
There are two theoretical possibilities here.  The first relies on the 
concept of zones of tolerance.205  The rivalry within the LDP, as well as its 
subsequent failure to retain its majority in the House of Representatives, 
may have raised the transaction costs of disciplining an assertive judiciary 
and presented reform-minded judges with an opportunity for judicial 
lawmaking.  The second, encountered earlier, is the idea that politicians use 
the judiciary as a form of insurance against electoral turnover.  The 
heightened political uncertainty, especially after the splintering of the LDP, 
might have recommended such a move to risk-averse legislators.  It thus 
seems as if the courts in Japan should have played a more active role in 
reviewing administrative action than in Singapore or China, and even more 
so in the recent decade.  Although one cannot be confident in saying that it 
was easier to bring an administrative case in Japan than in Singapore or 
China before 1993, restrictions on standing under Japanese law have been 
gradually eroded over the last ten years.  
However, whether political fragmentation is the genuine reason for 
this development may be disputed.  The bureaucrats in Japan loom large in 
state affairs, leading some to wonder who actually governs the country.206  In 
this vein, commentators on Japanese law have surmised that the shift in the 
legal landscape could be driven by politicians attempting to rein in the civil 
service. 207   For example, Hitoshi Ushijima, a professor of law at Chuo 
University, speculates that “the LDP, partly supported by the opposition JDP, 
has been trying to challenge the traditionally strong bureaucracy through 
administrative, regulatory, and judicial reforms, and producing 
administrative law-conscious lawyers.”208  The erosion of public trust in the 
                                                   
204 See, e.g., Kenny Chee, Not Ready to Lead for Now, Says Opposition, ASIAONE NEWS (Mar. 24, 
2011), http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Singapore/Story/A1Story20110324-269714.html. 
205 See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the 
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2001); 
see also Mate, supra note 9. 
206 See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY: 1925–1975 320–24 (1982); KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER: PEOPLE 
AND POLITICS IN A STATELESS NATION 216–20 (1989); RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 203, at 121. 
207 GOODMAN, supra note 37, at 462 (observing that “[t]here has been a drive for regulatory reform in 
Japan with emphasis on reducing the power of the bureaucracy.”). 
208 HITOSHI USHIJIMA, supra note 68, at 88; see Katsuya Uga, Development of the Concepts of 
Transparency and Accountability in Japanese Administrative Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 
276, 294 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) (“[T]he LDP itself also overcame its strong allergy to information 
disclosure once it had experienced a period as an opposition party.  Through that experience, the LDP 
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bureaucracy after a series of scandals in the 1990s provided the opportune 
moment for politicians to seize the initiative.209  However, this is unlikely to 
be the whole story since the case law had evolved even prior to the 2004 
amendments to the Administrative Case Litigation Law. 
The second source of variance between Japan, Singapore, and China 
may be found in the relationship between national and local governments. 
Singapore is an island country 274.1 square miles in size.210  There are no 
local governments operating in the city-state.  Although each constituency 
has its own town council, these organizations are headed by the local 
Member of Parliament (MP) and typically charged with managing the 
common areas of Housing Development Board estates.  Japan, on the other 
hand, is organized into forty-seven administrative divisions.  The 
constitution guarantees local self-government, and Article 93 provides for 
the establishment of “deliberative organs,” further specifying that “chief 
executive officers of all local public entities, the members of their 
assemblies, and such other local officials as may be determined by law shall 
be elected by direct popular vote within their several communities.” 211  
Article 95 also prohibits the Diet from enacting laws “applicable only to one 
local public entity . . . without the consent of the majority of voters of the 
local public entity concerned.”212  The national government may, however, 
assign functions to local governments for the implementation of national 
programs.  It also exercises influence over local initiatives through the 
budget.  The latter phenomenon is sardonically encapsulated in the phrase 
san-wari jichi, or “one-third autonomy,” a reference to the percentage of 
local government revenue generated by local taxes.213
Similar to Japan, China is organized into thirty-four administrative 
regions, including twenty-three provinces, five municipal districts, four 
counties, and two special administrative regions.214  Each division has its 
own people’s government and congress that fall directly under the Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                       
discovered that information disclosure would strengthen its position vis-à-vis bureaucrats, whether it was a 
ruling party or an opposition party.”). 
209 See, e.g., Velisarios Kattoulas, Corruption Scandals Rack Tokyo’s ‘Iron Triangle’: Struggle for 
Power in Japan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 1996),  http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/07/news/07iht-
scandal.t.html; Cameron W. Barr, Scandal Taints Japan’s Once Pristine Bureaucracy, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 13, 1996, http://www.csmonitor.com/1996/1213/121396.intl.intl.4.html.  
210 This is slightly larger than San Francisco and smaller than New York City. 
211 NIHONKOKU KENPƿ [KENPƿ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 93 (Japan). 
212 Id. art. 95. 
213 STEVEN R. REED, JAPANESE PREFECTURES AND POLICYMAKING 27 (1986). 
214 See ZHONGGUO XINGZHENG QUHUA WANG ( ѝ ഭ 㹼 ᭯ ४ ࡂ 㖁 ) [THE WEBSITE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF CHINA], http://www.xzqh.org.cn/ (last visited on Oct 26, 2015). 
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central government’s authority.215  Per Article 96 and Article 105 of the 
Chinese Constitution, “local people’s congresses at various levels are local 
organs of state power.” 216   The people’s congresses of provinces and 
municipalities and their corresponding standing committees may adopt local 
regulations after reporting such regulations to the Standing Committee of the 
NPC for the record.217  The Constitution also grants local governors great 
latitude in managing local affairs and implementing state policy.  To contain 
the influence of local administrators, the Chinese national government 
forbids citizens from taking up positions of political leadership in their 
region of origin and limits the term of provincial leaders to five years.  In 
contrast to the situation in Japan and China, the Singapore government does 
not shoulder the costs associated with having their policy objectives 
mediated or contradicted by the practices of local governing bodies. These 
disparities are reflected in each county’s respective standing rules.  In China, 
the central government and the CCP are insulated from judicial review as a 
matter of both law and practice—it is typically local administrators and 
bureaucrats who are vulnerable.  These currents are also at work in Japan 
where the law has permitted certain forms of “public suits” against local 
governments.218  Indeed, Ramseyer and Nakazato contend that the Japanese 
courts have been complicit in diluting the discretion of local governors, most 
of whom were not members of the long-ruling LDP.219  There is no such 
dimension to Singapore administrative law. 
V. ALTERNATIVE MONITORING MECHANISMS 
Nevertheless, there is at least one other decision problem faced by 
political principals that is not adequately described by existing PPT models.  
Though it has not been fully theorized in the existing work on comparative 
                                                   
215 “People’s congresses and people's governments are established in provinces, municipalities 
directly under the Central Government, counties, cities, municipal districts, townships, nationality 
townships, and towns.  The organization of local people’s congresses and local people’s governments at 
various levels is prescribed by law.  Organs of self-government are established in autonomous regions, 
autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties.”  XIANFA art. 95 (1982) (China), http://en.pkulaw.cn/dis
play.aspx?cgid=1457&lib=law. 
216 Id. at art. 96 (“Local people's congresses at various levels are local organs of state power.  Local 
people's congresses at and above the county level establish standing committees.”); id. at art. 105 (“Local 
people's governments at various levels are the executive bodies of local organs of state power as well as the 
local organs of state administration at the corresponding levels.”). 
217 Id. at art. 105 (“Governors, mayors and heads of counties, districts, townships and towns assume 
overall responsibility for local people's governments at various levels.”). 
218 See, e.g., John Marshall, Credible Commitments: Taxpayer Suits and Freedom of Information in 
Japan, 16, (unpublished paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association), http://fs.huntingdon.edu/jlewis/FOIA/AsiaFOIA/MarshallJonAPSA01a.pdf. 
219 RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 36, at 217–18. 
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administrative law, alternative monitoring mechanisms could substitute or 
supplement judicial review.  
In Japan, the administrative counseling system “provides the 
opportunity for analyzing public complaints with a view towards improving 
the performance of administrative agencies”—it is a “link in the chain of 
administrative remedies available in Japan.” 220   The Administrative 
Management Agency (AMA) was established in 1955 to receive public 
complaints about national public administration agencies.  Despite the 
AMA’s apparent independence, its high status in the Japanese government 
made it appear inaccessible to ordinary citizens.  Therefore, in 1961, the 
government appointed 882 local administrative councilors to be stationed 
across the country.  These councilors, though initially confined to relaying 
grievances to the Administrative Inspection Bureau of the AMA, were 
gradually permitted to participate in dispute resolution.  For citizens, the 
dual advantages of the Bureau’s administrative complaint investigations lie 
in its scope—it could handle cases involving any act of administrative 
agencies—and its speed.  It is also procedurally less daunting than judicial 
solutions.  In addition to having bureaus in the major cities, the AMA 
operates an exclusive hotline for members of the public to lodge complaints 
against administrative agencies.  As a result, the annual number of cases 
filed with the AMA surged to almost 200,000 in the years preceding 1987. 
In Singapore, the 1996 Wee Chong Jin Constitutional Commission 
recommended the establishment of an ombudsman to handle complaints 
against government agencies.221  Parliament, however, rejected this proposal, 
preferring for disputes to be brought to the attention of MPs or the Feedback 
Unit.  The Meet the People Session (MPS) is an avenue for ordinary citizens 
to appeal to their MPs for assistance.  It is typically a weekly affair, held in 
the evening for residents in a particular MP’s ward.222  The complainant 
describes his or her situation to a petition-writer, who prepares a statement to 
be presented to the MP.  The MP then hears the grievance in person before 
signing off on the drafted letter and delivering it to the relevant ministry or 
statutory boards. 223   Although civil servants are obliged to respond to 
                                                   
220 Akira Osuka, The “Ombudsman” in Japan, 9 WASEDA BULL. COMP. L. 1, 2 (1990). 
221 Li-Ann Thio, The Passage of a Generation, in EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION 7, 37 (Thio Li-ann 
& Kevin Y.L. Tan eds., 2009). 
222 The material that follows draws on the experience of one of the authors who previously 
volunteered as a petition writer at MPS. 
223 Statutory boards are the Singapore equivalent of administrative agencies. 
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correspondence from MPs, they do not have to revise their initial policy or 
make an exception, and it is not unusual for a petition to be denied. 
In China, the central government relies on “letters and visits,” or 
xinfang, to collect public feedback and identify corrupt or disobedient local 
officials.224  The xinfang process in China was originally established in 1951 
pursuant to “The Decision of State Council Referring to Receive Letters and 
Visits of People.”225 It serves “as an alternative to formal legal channels for 
many citizens seeking to resolve their grievances.”226  Xinfang offices accept 
complaints, proposals, and opinions raised by citizens through letters, e-
mails, telephone calls, or personal visits.227  The significance of xinfang is 
reflected in the numbers.228 From 1992 to 2004, the total amount of xinfang
petitions in China increased by more than ten percent each year, reaching a 
peak of 13,736,000 in 2004.229 10,336,000 xinfang petitions were filed in 
2009.230  
                                                   
224 Michael Palmer, Controlling the State?: Mediation in Administrative Litigation in the People’s 
Republic of China, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 175 (2006); Vai Io Lo, Resolution of 
Civil Disputes in China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 117, 120 (2000). 
225 Zhengwuyuan Guanyu Chuli Renmin Laixin he Jiejian Renmin Gongzuo de Jueding (࣑᭯䲒ޣҾ
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&keyword=ޣҾ༴⨶Ӫ≁ᶕؑ&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate. 
226 Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 103, 120 (2006). 
227 Xinfang Tiaoli (ؑ䇯ᶑֻ) [Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits] (promulgated by State 
Council, October 1, 2005, effective May 1, 2005), Art. 2 (China), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=3920
&lib=law&SearchKeyword=Regulation%20on%20Complaint%20Letters%20and%20Visits&SearchCKey
word=# (“The term ‘complaint letters and visits’ as mentioned in the present Regulation refers to the 
activities that a citizen, legal person or any other organization who, by way of letter, e-mail, telephone or 
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various levels or working departments of the people's governments at or above the county level, which shall 
be dealt with by the relevant administrative organs according to law.  A citizen, legal person or any other 
organization who, through any foresaid method, reports facts, submits proposals or opinions, or files a 
complaint shall be addressed as the complaint maker.”). 
228 Minzner, supra note 226, at 105 (“According to the director of the national xinfang bureau, the 
State Bureau for Letters and Calls, letters and visits to Party and government xinfang bureaus at the county 
level and higher totaled 8,640,040 for the first nine months of 2002, corresponding with an annual rate of 
11.5 million per year.” (citation omitted)). 
229 Ma Huaide, Yufang Huajie Shehui Maodun De Zhiben Zhice: Guifan Gongquanli (亴䱢ॆ䀓⽮Պ
⸋⴮Ⲵ⋫ᵜѻㆆ˖㿴㤳ޜᵳ࣋) [The Strategy of Preventing and Resolving Social Conflicts: Regulating 
Public Power], 2 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (୰ᅜἲᏛ) [CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 45, 45 (2012). 
230 Id. (citing Zhang Enxi, Guanyu Shehui Maodun Huajie De Sikao Yu Shijian (ޣҾ⽮Պ⸋⴮ॆ䀓
Ⲵᙍ㘳оᇎ䐥) [The Contemplation and Practice on Resolving Social Conflicts], 1 BEIJING ZHENGFA 
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There are a number of reasons why Chinese citizens resort to xinfang
for administrative disputes.  First, judicial review is unreliable.  Yu Jianrong, 
a law professor at Peking University, interviewed 632 xinfang rural 
petitioners filing complaints in Beijing in 2004.  Of these petitioners, 401 
had previously tried to pursue legal avenues for redress.  Of the 401 
petitioners, 172 did not manage to obtain a judicial hearing, 220 were 
unjustly denied relief, and nine were seeking to have favorable judicial 
decisions enforced.231  Furthermore, in contrast to the standing requirements 
for administrative litigation, xinfang bureaus receive a broad range of 
petitions, including those not based on legal arguments.  The administrative 
acts challenged through xinfang do not need to implicate the petitioners’ 
personal and property rights.  For example, the Discipline Inspection Bureau 
of Hunan reported that the complaints about “unfair and offensive conduct” 
made up twenty-five percent of all xinfang petitions in Hunan between 1995 
and 1998. 232   In addition, the remedies available through xinfang are 
perceived to be effective when granted.  This is because state and local 
agencies are more likely to follow the directions of their superiors in the 
governmental hierarchy than to obey a court order.233  
However, petitioners visiting xinfang bureaus risk being physically 
intercepted by agents of local authorities, a phenomenon known as 
jiefang.234  This tactic, justified by the purported need to suppress potential 
“mass incidents” and the political strategy of “buying stability,” has 
restricted the access of aggrieved citizens to xinfang and prevented petitions 
from being heard by higher-level administrators.235   Under the cover of 
“maintaining stability,” jiefang has impeded petitioners attempting to contact 
the state xinfang bureau or even the government at the next level.236  For 
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System in China], 2 ZHONGGUO GAIGE (ѝഭ᭩䶙) [CHINA REFORM] 26, 27 (2005).  
232 Zhao Yansen, Xinfang Jubaoliang de Bianhua yu Sikao [The Change and Analysis of the Total 
Amount of Xinfang Petitions], 4 ZHONGGUO JIANCHA [SUPERVISION IN CHINA] 47, 47 (2000). 
233 Liu Renwen, Zhongguo Nongmin Weihe Xin “Fang” Bu Xin “Fa” [Why the Chinese Trust 
Xinfang Rather than Law], 14 ZHONGGUO XINWEN ZHOUKAN [CHINA NEWSWEEK] 87, 87 (2009).  See also
Minzner, supra note 226, at 124–129. 
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example, according to an investigation of several provinces in 2006, 
including Henan, Liaoning and Shandong, some grassroots organizations, 
and even local xinfang offices that did not fulfill their responsibilities to 
resolve petitions, spent a substantial amount of funds on arranging the 
interception of state xinfang petitioners.237  Even though the Chinese central 
government has managed to constrain jiefang238 and a few perpetrators of 
jiefang were punished by courts,239 some local governors are still willing to 
risk punishment to avoid a blemish on their reputations that may cost them 
an opportunity for promotion.240
These examples demonstrate that courts are not the only means for 
principals to obtain information on the activity of their agents.  Alternatives 
such as administrative counseling, MPS, or xinfang may be used in lieu of 
judicial review.  The availability of multiple channels of supervision thus 
raises some interesting questions for PPT.  In particular, non-judicial 
mechanisms and administrative law are not perfect substitutes. First, the 
quality and quantity of information collected differs.  For instance, because 
lawsuits are generally expensive and time-consuming, they tend to involve 
administrative actions that have a significant financial, emotional, or 
symbolic impact on the complainant.  In contrast, grievances filed under a 
less formal process might range from trivial to serious.  Second, judicial 
resolution of an administrative dispute is public and could create precedent 
in common law jurisdictions.  If the principal prefers fluid results to the 
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creation of legal rules, he or she should avoid excessive reliance on legal 
institutions. 
Figure 6 
Third, it is less politically costly to change the outcome of a more 
informal or bureaucratic style of adjudication than it is to change judicial 
dispositions.  This is because ignoring or reversing a court decision risks 
undermining the stability provided by the larger judicial system.  Finally, 
non-judicial actors typically do not enjoy the same institutional protections 
as judges and are vulnerable to capture by the agents being supervised241 or 
by an incoming political administration.242  Thus, principals should continue 
to rely on courts if bureaucrats are influential or if they expect a turn in the 
political tides. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent literature has attempted to assess the plausibility of a PPT 
account of administrative law by applying and evaluating it in a comparative 
setting.  Magill and Ortiz argue that a basic prediction of PPT (presidential 
systems ought to rely more heavily on judicial review) is contradicted by 
their findings about reasonable review doctrines in United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany.  On the other hand, Garoupa and Mathews 
try to reconcile PPT with a number of case studies by introducing an 
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additional element into the analysis: the principal-agent relationship between 
the legislature and the judiciary.  
This article compares the class of plaintiffs entitled to seek judicial 
review of administrative action in three party-dominated countries, Japan, 
Singapore, and China.  These countries share similar cultural attitudes 
towards the use of law and have low-autonomy courts.  From a cursory 
examination of each country’s respective codes and case law, it is fair to 
conclude that before 2014, standing requirements were more stringent in 
China than in Japan. Singapore is a common law jurisdiction that considers 
questions of locus standi using the substantial interest test.  In particular, the 
two-stage test articulated by R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p 
National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd. and 
seemingly accepted by Singapore courts necessitates a balancing between 
the merits of the case and the degree of a plaintiff’s concern.  This wrinkle 
makes any rough comparison between Singapore and the other two 
jurisdictions contestable and highly subjective.  Looking across time, 
however, it is clear that the class of eligible plaintiffs has expanded in Japan, 
particularly over the last decade.  In China, there had been intense discussion 
about the liberalization of standing that culminated in the 2014 amendments.  
There are still no signs of any pronounced push for relaxed standing rules in 
Singapore. 
The analysis suggests that some of these differences are adequately 
captured by the political economy approach to administrative law.  First, the 
LDP is factionalized and has experienced strong inter-party political 
competition since 1993, whereas the PAP and the CCP have comfortably 
retained power until today.  The dilution of political power allows the 
judiciary more space to maneuver and increases the demand for insurance.  
Second, the national government in Japan, as well as China, has to govern 
through local authorities.  The friction and devolution of power generates 
agency costs that courts could help mitigate.  
Table 5 
Local Governments Political Turnover
Japan Yes Yes
China Yes No
Singapore No No
JANUARY 2016 EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 131 
The takeaway is that three factors may be relevant to a PPT account of 
comparative administrative law. First, local governments, in addition to 
administrative agencies, are sometimes also agents of the national 
government.243  As such, administrative law can help principals regulate the 
acts of local governments and those of agencies.  Second, political turnover 
may influence the shape of administrative law.  For example, incumbent 
legislators may support judicial review if they know they might be out of 
power sometime in the future.  The availability of courts as a forum for 
contesting administrative actions is useful for political interests that are not 
fully represented by the legislatures or executives.  Third is the possibility of 
using monitoring mechanisms other than judicial review.  The former and 
the latter are not perfect substitutes.  Hence, the decision to rely on a non-
judicial agent, a court, or both, depends on the transaction costs of 
overriding a judicial decision, the quantity and quality of information desired, 
and, once again, political turnover.  If there is political turnover, judicial 
review by independent courts might be favored over other mechanisms that 
are controlled by the executives or legislatures.  
In conclusion, some of the differences in standing doctrine observed 
between Japan, China, and Singapore are adequately captured by the PPT 
approach to administrative law.  However, there is a possibility that the 
theory might not always generate clear predictions for comparative 
administrative law.  This is because the availability of non-judicial 
mechanisms for monitoring agent conduct introduces a new dimension into 
the analysis that has not been taken in account by Magill and Ortiz or 
Garoupa and Mathews.  PPT must be supplemented by research into the 
choice of monitoring agents and the allocation of power between them. 
                                                   
243 This is not true of the United States.  The system of dual sovereignty and the nondelegation 
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